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ABSTRACT
The first chapter examines the long-run and short-run elasticity of income with
respect to changes in tax rates. The Elasticity of Taxable Income (ETI) is a largelydebated parameter in both research and policy. Despite the growing importance
of ETI, the literature has not fully considered the intertemporal impacts of taxation.
I expand the literature by estimating short-run and long-run impacts of tax rate
changes relying on the most recent estimation method and using appropriate
lagged values of income when constructing the predicted net-of-tax rate
instruments. The short-run ETI in the baseline specification is 0.69 whereas
estimates for the Elasticity of Broad Income (EBI) are much smaller and imprecise.
The second chapter studies the impact of tax base on the elasticity of income. Most
of the existing literature has appropriately used a constant definition of taxable
income to focus on the effects of tax rate changes. It is important to recognize that
a decrease in the tax base (in the form of a new deduction, exemption, or credit,
for example) can create new opportunities for legal tax avoidance without altering
real behavior. Using the most recent estimation method, I estimate the impact of
tax base on the behavioral responses to taxation. Estimated results for the impact
of tax base are much smaller than those in the existing literature. The third chapter
examines the possible linkages between school choice and home values. I use
home prices to draw inferences about households’ value for school choice, and a
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for enrollment among four different types of
schools as a proxy measure of school choice. I empirically test two hypotheses: 1)
less concentrated counties will have less variability in home prices, 2) less
concentrated counties will have higher median home prices. Based on county-level
data, I find evidence that an increase in competition for enrollment is associated
with a decrease in inequality of home prices within the county. Moreover, I find
evidence of an overall increase in home prices within the counties following
increased competition for enrollment among schools.
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CHAPTER I
DYNAMIC INCOME RESPONSES TO TAX REFORM: NEW
ESTIMATES

1.1 Introduction
Taxation creates a burden on individuals, causing behavioral changes and
implying inefficiencies and distortions in the free market. Studying this behavioral
response is vital in understanding the deadweight loss derived from taxation as
well as in formulating optimal taxation. The current literature on the elasticity of
taxable income (ETI) considers mostly short-run responses of changes in tax rates,
and despite the growing importance of ETI for both research and policy, the
literature has not fully considered the intertemporal impacts of taxation. The
existing literature on the intertemporal impacts for changes in tax rates uses
instruments for marginal net-of-tax rates1 constructed based on initial-year income.
However, Weber (2014) shows that such instruments are endogenous. She
addresses this concern by using appropriate lagged values of income when
constructing the predicted marginal net-of-tax rate instruments. I apply the
estimation method developed by Weber (2014) to estimate the intertemporal
impacts of taxation.
The ETI literature is vast. However, the recent literature on ETI mostly
examines short-run responses. The specifications used to examine such short-run
responses assume that taxpayers’ responses to taxation are immediate, which is
a very strong assumption. The inherent nature of tax reform provides an
opportunity for tax avoidance and adjustment of income across periods. In most
cases there are large lags among the formulation of the draft proposal, enacting
the tax reform and implementing it. For example, the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA86) was formulated in 1985, approved and signed into law in 1986 and finally
implemented in 1987. Furthermore, phase-in and phase-out mechanisms also
contribute to these lags, which enable the taxpayers to be aware of future changes
in tax law well before they go into effect. Because future tax rates are predictable,

1

Marginal net-of-tax rate is one minus marginal tax rate.
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tax filers have an incentive to shift income between adjacent years to avoid taxes
without altering longer-term real behavior. In such case, the magnitude of the
short-run responses can be larger than that of the long-run responses. However,
responses to tax changes can also take time. For instance, one might change
his/her long-term investment decision in response to tax changes, or one might
consider changing educational or career plan in response to tax changes. In such
cases, short-run responses can be smaller than long-run responses. Therefore,
the relative magnitude of short- and long-run responses can be ambiguous and is
subject to empirical investigation.
Giertz (2010) is one of the studies in the literature that examines intertemporal
responses to tax changes. He follows the conventional literature by using
instruments for marginal net-of-tax rates constructed based on base-year income.
However, the recent literature has shown that the use of conventional instruments
constructed using base-year income does not guarantee the exogeneity of the
instruments, and therefore it is very unlikely that the estimates presented by Giertz
(2010) are unbiased estimates of ETI. Utilizing the variation created by TRA86, I
extend the literature by investigating the intertemporal behavioral responses and
thereby separating the transient responses from the permanent responses to
marginal tax rate changes using a more recently developed estimation method that
addresses the endogeneity of the instruments due to mean reversion. I discuss
mean reversion in the following section. Results are sensitive to specifications and
provide some weak evidence for intertemporal adjustment of income although this
evidence is suspect. For the baseline specification, the short-run ETI is 0.685 and
there is no evidence for intertemporal adjustment. Estimates for the elasticity of
broad income2 (EBI) are smaller compared to ETI estimates. My estimates are
larger in magnitude than those in the existing literature for intertemporal
adjustments.

1.2 Literature Review
Estimating the sensitivity of income to changes in tax rates requires exogenous
changes in tax rates. However, because the marginal tax rate is a function of
income which is the dependent variable of the estimation equation, the observed
tax rates are clearly endogenous. This concern has been widely recognized in the
literature. The literature has addressed this issue by mostly utilizing a difference
form specification and using marginal tax rates defined for some base-year income
in the pair of observations as instruments. However, concerns of endogeneity still

2

Broad income is an extensive definition of income which does not consider adjustments and
deductions. I provide the definition of broad income in Section 1.4.2.
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remain because the marginal tax rates constructed from base-year income are still
a function of the dependent variable. As documented by Weber (2014), mean
reversion and changing distribution of income can also lead to endogeneity in tax
rates. For example, mean reversion causes the high income of top earners in the
base year to fall in the subsequent year because the high income in the base year
is likely to be due to a positive transitory income which is unrelated to tax changes,
thereby producing a negative correlation between the base-year income and the
error term in difference form. On the other hand, a widening distribution of income
can produce a positive correlation between the base-year income and the error
term. Because base-year income and the error term are correlated; and the tax
rate is a direct function of base year income, the instrument for the net-of-tax rate
will also be correlated with the error term.
Feldstein (1995) is one of the pioneer studies that estimates ETI utilizing panel
data. Based on different specifications and using the difference-in-differences
method, he reports ETI estimates that range from 1 to 3. Following Feldstein
(1995), a large number of panel-based studies emerged addressing different
econometric issues discussed in the literature to obtain consistent and unbiased
estimates. Auten and Carroll (1999) address mean reversion and diverging
distribution of income by controlling for lagged income in the estimating equation.
They report an elasticity of 0.55. Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000) use panel data from
the Survey of Consumer Finances instead of tax return data and examine the effect
of the variation in marginal tax rates arising from TRA86. They report elasticity
estimates ranging from 0.35 to 0.97. They also estimate the sensitivity of labor
supply with respect to tax rate changes and conclude that the rise of taxable
income of high-income individuals is not accompanied by an increase in reported
labor supply. These conclusions are consistent with the notion of possible retiming
of income. Gruber and Saez (2002) introduce the use of income splines to control
for mean reversion and heterogeneous trends; and separate income and
substitution effects of tax changes. They rely on the public use version of panel tax
data and use the variation caused by TRA86. They find an elasticity of taxable
income of 0.40 and an elasticity of broad income (EBI) of 0.12.
Weber (2014) introduces a new instrument to address the mean reversion
issue widely discussed in the literature. She uses lagged income instead of baseyear income to construct instruments for net-of-tax rates. She also verifies that as
the number of lags increases, the lagged income and hence the instruments
constructed from that lagged income become more orthogonal to the error term.
She identifies the instruments based on lagged income using a testable
assumption regarding the degree of serial correlation in the error term. Based on
panel tax data for years 1979-1990 and addressing mean reversion issues, she
reports an ETI estimate of 0.858 and EBI estimate of 0.475. Her reported ETI
estimate is twice as large as that reported in Gruber and Saez (2002). Kawano et
al. (2016) use the variation from the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 to
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estimate EBI. They use an inverse probability weighting (IPW)3 in the context of a
difference in differences approach and find significantly lower estimates of EBI
ranging from 0.013 to 0.034.
The notion of timing of income receipt was rooted in the hierarchy of behavioral
responses to taxation by Slemrod (1990). He suggests a hierarchy of three tiers
of behavioral response to taxation. First two tiers of his hierarchy include timing
and avoidance whereas the third tier refers to behavioral responses. Using panel
data and focusing on realized capital gains, Burman and Randolph (1994) provide
evidence for substantially smaller permanent effects than transitory effects. Bakija
and Heim (2008), on the other hand, investigate the impact of taxation on
charitable giving. They use an instrumental variable approach for estimating the
elasticity of charitable giving with respect to its current and future prices. They find
evidence for re-timing of giving in response to predictable future changes in federal
tax rates, however, this finding is sensitive to source of identification.
The ETI literature, however, contains a few companion studies investigating
the intertemporal impacts of tax changes on taxable income; and these studies are
most relevant for my study. Kreiner et al. (2016) examine the ETI using monthly
payroll data and provide evidence for intertemporal shifting of wage income with
respect to tax rate changes. However, removing the data for a few months around
the point of time when the tax change takes place, they find the elasticity close to
zero. Goolsbee (2000) examines the responsiveness of income of high-income
executives with respect to changes in tax rates and provides evidence for a shortrun shift in the timing of realization of compensation rather than a permanent
reduction in income. Sammartino and Weiner (1997) demonstrate that income
shifted backward in time from 1993 into 1992 (even when excluding capital gains)
in response to President-elect Bill Clinton’s promised tax increase on high-income
taxpayers. One of the most relevant studies for my present study is Giertz (2010).
He investigates intertemporal responses of taxable income by using the variation
from the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Acts (OBRAs) of 1990 and 1993.
Based on panels of U.S. tax returns, he estimates short-run and long-run
responses of taxable income to changes in tax rates. Giertz (2010) addresses the
endogeneity in the tax rates by using predicted marginal net-of-tax rates based on
base-year income. However, as explained previously, the use of base-year income
in constructing the instruments does not guarantee that endogeneity in marginal
tax rates will be resolved. Giertz (2010) reports larger long-run estimates than
short-run estimates. Another companion study examining intertemporal responses
is Holmlund and Soderstrom (2011). They investigate the intertemporal responses
using panel data on Swedish tax reform for years 1991-2002 and report the long-

3

IPW approach removes the confounding by using inverse of probability as weights.
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run estimates between 0.10 to 0.30. The intertemporal aspects considered in their
study capture the habit persistence from past tax rates, however, the responses to
predictable future tax rates are not considered. To the extent that taxpayers are
aware of future tax changes ahead of time and that they intertemporally optimize
by altering their current behavior in response to predictable future tax changes, the
specification used in Holmlund and Soderstrom (2011) is also mis-specified.
All of these concerns involving current knowledge on intertemporal responses
to tax changes call for a further extension of the literature. My study uses the
instruments developed by Weber (2014) and extends the literature by addressing
the endogeneity due to mean reversion in estimating short-run and long-run
impacts of tax rates. Specifically, I use lagged values of income when constructing
predicted net-of-tax rates, and test various lags of income for robustness. My
baseline specification includes instruments based on 1-year lagged income and
examines the endogeneity of this instrument assuming that instruments
constructed from 2-year and 3-year lagged income are exogenous. I discuss the
rationale behind such lag structure for constructing instruments at the end of the
next section.

1.3 Model
Changes in tax rates can affect taxpayers’ behavior in several ways. If tax rates
increase, labor becomes more expensive relative to leisure. Therefore, an increase
in tax rates can cause a decrease in labor supply thereby a decrease in income
because of the substitution effect. An income effect can lead to an opposite result.
Although in general, the magnitude of the elasticity of primary earners’ labor supply
varies across studies, the magnitude for the secondary earner has been found to
be large (Eissa, 1995). Second, different forms of income are taxed at different
rates, and some forms are exempt from taxation. For example, in 1990 taxpayers
could claim tax exemption for a certain type of interest income as well as for a
portion of pensions and annuities and IRA distributions. More interestingly, highincome taxpayers, in most cases, can shift their income towards tax-favored forms
of income, for instance, fringe benefits, stock options, etc. An increase (or
decrease) in tax rates encourages taxpayers to take advantage of such tax
treatment by shifting income towards tax-favored components. Not only do the
taxpayers shift their income across components of income, but they can also shift
expenditure towards tax-favored components to reduce taxable income. For
example, an increase in tax rates can motivate taxpayers to increase their taxdeductible expenditures on home mortgages, medical and dental treatments, or
charitable contributions. A change in tax rates can also affect the extent of
compliance with the tax laws regarding the accuracy of the reported income. An
increased tax rate raises the opportunity cost of compliance and, therefore, may
encourage tax evasion. Third, individuals can shift income across time to take
5

advantage of a favorable tax treatment. For example, if a taxpayer expects the tax
rate to fall in the future period, he/she may consider deferring some compensation
or pension income from the current to the future period, and/or he/she may
consider shifting income from taxable bond to municipal bond in the current period
to avoid taxes. Kreiner et al. (2016) provide evidence that employees shift their
wage income intertemporally in an anticipation of tax changes.
To explain intertemporal responses, I use the following intertemporal model
that is employed by Goolsbee (2000). Giertz (2010) and Bakija and Heim (2008)
have also employed similar specification.
ln(

𝑌𝑖 𝑡+1
𝑌𝑖 𝑡

) = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡 𝜷𝟏 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑛

(1−𝜏𝑖 𝑡+1 )
(1−𝜏𝑖 𝑡 )

(1−𝜏

)

+ 𝛽3 𝑙𝑛 (1−𝜏𝑖 𝑡+2 ) + 𝜈𝑖 𝑡

(1.1)

𝑖 𝑡+1

Equation (1.1) can also be written as follows.
∆𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡 𝜷𝟏 + 𝛽2 ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑖 𝑡 ) + 𝛽3 ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑖 𝑡+1 ) + 𝜈𝑖 𝑡

(1.2)

In equation (1.1), 𝜏𝑖 𝑡 is current marginal tax rate4 of individual 𝑖 at time period
𝑡, 𝜏𝑖 𝑡+1 is the marginal tax rate of individual 𝑖 at time period 𝑡 + 1, and 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is income.
𝑋𝑖𝑡 represents a set of control variables used in the estimation, 𝛾𝑡 represent year
(1−𝜏
)
fixed effects and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 represents unobserved error. Here, 𝑙𝑛 (1−𝜏𝑖 𝑡+1) represents
𝑖𝑡

change in current year’s marginal tax rates in log form whereas 𝛽2 represents the
percentage change in taxable income for a one percent change in current period’s
(1−𝜏
)
net-of-tax rates. Moreover, 𝑙𝑛 (1−𝜏𝑖 𝑡+2 ) represents the change in anticipatory future
𝑖 𝑡+1

tax rates whereas the coefficient 𝛽3 represents the responses to anticipatory future
net-of-tax rates on income. Even though this model has been employed in the
literature, one may cast doubt regarding the validity of the specification as the
(1−𝜏
)
(1−𝜏
)
numerator of 𝑙𝑛 (1−𝜏𝑖 𝑡+1) and the denominator of 𝑙𝑛 (1−𝜏𝑖 𝑡+2 ) may seem to cancel out
𝑖𝑡

𝑖 𝑡+1

each other from the right had side of the equation. However, they may cancel out
only when 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 are equal which is very unlikely. Furthermore, intuitively, the
(1−𝜏
)
denominator of 𝑙𝑛 (1−𝜏𝑖 𝑡+2 ) is an anticipated measure of the future year’s marginal
𝑖 𝑡+1

net-of-tax rates whereas the numerator of 𝑙𝑛

(1−𝜏𝑖 𝑡+1 )
(1−𝜏𝑖 𝑡 )

is the marginal net-of-tax rate

that taxpayers are aware of. Because there can be error involved in the anticipation
process, these two terms may not necessarily be equal and cancel out each other
in the right-hand side of equation (1.1). Moreover, as I have explained in previous
sections, tax rates are endogenous and therefore I use instrumental variables for

4

This tax rate refers to the sum of federal and state tax rates.
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𝑙𝑛

(1−𝜏𝑖 𝑡+1 )
(1−𝜏𝑖 𝑡 )

(1−𝜏

)

and 𝑙𝑛 (1−𝜏𝑖 𝑡+2). The estimation of equation (1.1) is based on the fitted

values of 𝑙𝑛

(1−𝜏𝑖 𝑡+1 )
(1−𝜏𝑖 𝑡 )

𝑖 𝑡+1

(1−𝜏

)

and 𝑙𝑛 (1−𝜏𝑖 𝑡+2) from the first stage regressions instead of
𝑖 𝑡+1

observed values for these two ratios. Since I am using fitted values instead of
observed values, these two variables should not cancel out each other. Following
previous studies in the literature, 𝛽2 represents the short-run elasticity and 𝛽2 + 𝛽3
represents the long-run elasticity.
The literature mostly uses difference-in-differences methods to estimate this
type of model. This approach yields consistent estimates if tax rate changes are
the only sources of income shocks. However, other non-tax factors (e.g.
heterogeneous income growth and mean reversion) can lead to inconsistent
estimates. Furthermore, because of the graduated tax rate schedule, tax rates are
endogenous and can lead to biased estimates. The existing literature uses the
instrumental variable approach and constructs instruments for marginal net-of-tax
rates based on initial-year income to address the endogeneity issue. However,
Weber (2014) shows that such instruments are endogenous. She uses lagged
income to construct the instrument and shows that increasing each additional lag
of income used to construct the instruments will make the instruments more
exogenous. I use a difference-in-differences estimation method with one-year
differences and apply the instruments developed by Weber (2014) to estimate the
intertemporal model (1). For one-year differences specification, I make pairs of
observations one year apart and regress the changes in income between pairs of
observations on changes in net-of-tax rates along with other control variables. The
predicted marginal tax rate for year 𝑡 based on 𝑘-year lagged income is defined as
follows.
𝑃 k 𝑙𝑎𝑔

𝜏𝑖 𝑡

= 𝝉(𝒀𝒊 𝒕−𝒌 , 𝒄𝒕 )

Here 𝒄𝒕 is the tax law of year 𝑡. Therefore, the instrument, for example, for
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑖 𝑡 ) based on one-year lagged income in equation (1.2) is defined as
𝑃 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔

𝑙𝑛

(1− 𝜏𝑖 𝑡+1 )
𝑃 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔

(1−𝜏𝑖 𝑡

)

and the instrument, for example, for ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑖 𝑡+1 ) based on one𝑃 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔

year lagged income in equation (1.2) is defined as 𝑙𝑛

(1− 𝜏𝑖 𝑡+2 )
𝑃 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔

(1−𝜏𝑖 𝑡+1 )

. This simply means

that the two predicted marginal tax rates in the difference form differ only by the
tax law and all other information for constructing the two predicted tax rates are
same.5

5

Net of marginal tax rate instruments are computed by running income with the same lags through
TAXSIM for the current year and the base year, and then taking the difference between the two
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Following Weber (2014), I use a Difference-in-Sargan test to assess the
endogeneity of the current- and lead-tax rate6 instruments. The Difference-inSargan test is a test of overidentifying restrictions that assumes a subset of
instruments as exogenous and tests the validity of suspect instruments. It checks
the validity of suspect instruments by computing the increase in Sargan’s J statistic
when such suspect instruments are added to the estimation. To test the validity of
two suspect instruments for two endogenous variables, at least three instruments
are needed that are assumed to be exogenous. This means that at least five
instruments are needed to implement Difference-in-Sargan test in a specification
with two endogenous variables. This requirement for the minimum number of
instruments is satisfied when I test the validity of instruments for current- and leadtax rates constructed from lagged income of year 𝑡 − 𝑖 assuming that instruments
constructed from income of years 𝑡 − 𝑗 and 𝑡 − 𝑘 are exogenous where 𝑖 < 𝑗 < 𝑘.
Here, I am using Weber’s (2014) approach to test validity of the suspect
instrument.

1.4 Data and Estimation Approach
1.4.1 Identification
Most studies in the ETI literature have employed a difference-in-differences or
a similar approach. This study follows the spirit of the conventional approach and
uses a difference-in-differences estimation method. For identification of the effect
of tax changes in an ideal scenario, the control group would not experience a tax
change, and the treatment group would experience a tax change. Unfortunately,
such a control group does not exist because the groups of taxpayers that face
differential tax treatments are also different in terms of demographic
characteristics. Therefore, the next best solution is to find two similar groups that
experience differential tax treatments. TRA86 creates an opportunity for
identification of the effect of tax changes because high-income taxpayers
experience larger reductions in tax rates than lower-income individuals. In an ideal
scenario, the two comparison groups are similar in every aspect except for

marginal tax rates. For instance, for constructing a tax rate instrument as a function of income of
two-year lag, I compute synthetic tax rates using income of year t-3 and tax codes for year t-1 (base
year); and similarly I compute synthetic tax rates using income of year t-3 and tax codes for year t;
and then I take the difference of the log of the two synthetic tax rates.
6 For simplicity, I refer to the marginal net-of-tax rate for the current period as current tax rate; and
marginal net-of-tax rate for the future period as lead tax rate.
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treatment status. However, in reality, the high- and low-income groups may not
necessarily be similar. Specifically, higher-income taxpayers generally have higher
income growth rates than lower-income individuals. Bound and Johnson (1992),
Kutz and Murphy (1992), Levy and Michel (1991), and Murphy and Welch (1992)
provide evidence that labor earning became more unequal during 1980s.
Moreover, Krugman (1992) highlights that very high-income households received
a disproportionately large share of income growth during 1980s. One obvious
approach to address these issues is to control for these heterogeneous
characteristics. However, the US-based studies generally utilize tax panel data
from the IRS, and these datasets generally include minimal socio-demographic
information. These identification concerns have drawn considerable attention in
the literature, and addressing these issues has been a difficult challenge because
such heterogeneous effects are not well understood. Several non-US studies claim
to be able to mitigate these issues by using rich socio-demographic information.
On the other hand, given the unavailability of such rich data, the US studies
commonly use income controls to mitigate these effects. I will discuss the
treatments to address these concerns in detail in later sections.
1.4.2 Data
I obtain the data used in this study from Statistics of Income (SOI) tax files for
U.S. tax returns for the years 1979-1990. The individual SOI tax files are combined
to construct a panel of years 1979-1990. Because the instruments are functions of
lagged income of up to four years, I lose observations of years 1979-1982 in the
estimation. Moreover, I also lose observations of year 1990 because the model
includes one-year lead tax rates and year 1989 because of the use of one-year
difference form. Therefore, the estimation is restricted to between 1983 and 1988.
The study primarily uses taxable income for the definition of income as a
dependent variable. An extension of this analysis to broad income is also
presented in a later section. Broad income is total income from all income sources
(except capital gains) that can be computed from the data for all years 1979-1990.
Most previous studies have excluded capital gains from the analysis. As is
common in the literature, I exclude capital gains from the analysis. Social security
benefits are also excluded from the definition of broad income because they are
not included in the data before 1984. Taxable income is defined as the broad
income minus above-the-line deductions (i.e., adjustments) minus the larger of
below-the-line deductions (i.e., the larger of standard deductions and itemized
deductions), minus personal exemptions that are available in each year.
Tax reforms generally involve changes in the tax base along with tax rates and
other changes. If the tax base varies systematically, then this variation in the tax
base can potentially bias the estimates. The literature has addressed this issue by
using a constant-law definition of taxable income. Consistent with the literature, I
use the definition of taxable income that is constant across reforms whereas the
9

constant-law definition of taxable income is close to the 1990 definition of taxable
income. All income, and deduction components are converted into 1992 dollars
using inflation indices used in Gruber and Saez (2002).
Marginal tax rates are computed using TAXSIM (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993),
a freely available internet version of the tax rate calculator developed by NBER. 7
TAXSIM computes federal and state marginal tax rates separately. The effective
marginal tax rate is a summation of state and federal marginal tax rates. Only
observations for which a taxpayer’s marital status do not change between the base
and the current years are included in the analysis because a change in marital
status can cause changes in income unrelated to changes in tax rates. Finally, as
has become standard in the literature, I exclude taxpayers whose taxable income
is less than $10,000 in the base year to reduce the impact of mean reversion. It is
evident in the literature that mean reversion is severe in the extreme low-income
range and avoiding this income group can help reduce the impact from mean
reversion. Following Weber (2014), I include several control variables in my
estimation, for example, indicators for marital status, and the number of dependent
children in the household, a full set of state and year dummy indicators. Table A.1
presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis.
1.4.3 Identification Issues
As explained in the previous section, the existence of heterogeneous income
trends and mean reversion poses a challenge in estimating ETI. These issues
have drawn substantial attention in the literature. Some studies were able to
partially control for heterogeneous trends by using demographic information. Other
studies have employed income controls to control for heterogeneous trends. Early
studies include income as a control in a linear fashion (Carroll, 1998). However, a
linear relationship between the income control variable and the error term may not
exist. More recent studies employ non-linear income splines to address the issue.
Non-linear income splines allow a smooth and non-linear relationship between the
income control variable and the error term. Gruber and Saez (2002) introduce the
use of income splines in the ETI literature, and the subsequent studies followed
Gruber and Saez (2002) by including income splines in the estimations to control
for mean reversion and heterogeneous trends. Following the literature I also use
income splines and include five-piece quintile splines based on income in the
estimating equation to control for heterogeneous trends. I also examine the
stability of the estimates by using non-linear income splines based on different lags
of income.

7

The internet version of TAXSIM is available at https://users.nber.org/~taxsim/taxsim27/
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1.4.4 Instrument Selection
This section explores the suitable instruments for the two endogenous
variables of interest: current- and lead-tax rates. Column 1 of Table 1.1 presents
replication of Weber’s (2014) ETI estimate using my data whereas columns 2-4 in
Table 1.1 present estimates for the second stage regression of equation (1.1)
using different lagged instruments for current- and lead-tax rates. The dependent
variable in all four columns is ∆𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 .The first stage regression estimates for this
table and all subsequent tables are included in Appendix A. The primary purpose
of Table 1.1 is to empirically examine and find the instruments that are exogenous
as well as correlated with the two endogenous regressors. Both first-stage and
second-stage regressions presented in Table 1.1 and all other subsequent tables
in this essay adjust for heteroscedasticity clustered by the individual level. Pflueger
et al. (2013) raises concern that when first-stage F-statistics do not adjust for
heteroscedasticity, the values of F-statistics can be large leading to rejection of
weak instruments. They suggest that F-statistics need to be adjusted for
heteroscedasticity to implement test for weakness of instruments. My results
address this concern by adjusting heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors
clustered at the individual level in all first-stage regressions. A Difference-inSargan test is employed to test the exogeneity of the instruments. The null
hypothesis of this test is that the suspect instrument(s) is(are) exogenous. The
weakness of the instruments is examined by comparing the F-statistics from the
first stage regressions with the minimum F-statistic suggested by Stock and Yogo
(2002). My estimated elasticity for Weber’s (2014) baseline specification is 0.722
whereas her reported estimate8 is 0.858. First-stage regression estimates for
Weber’s (2014) specification is presented in Table A.2 in Appendix A.

I have some limitations while replicating Weber’s (2014) estimates. Weber’s estimates are based
on the full version of TAXSIM which utilizes all the variables in SOI and which is available
exclusively on NBER server. On the other hand, I use the publicly available version of TAXSIM
which computes tax rates based on only 27 input variables and does not take into account all the
available variables in SOI. For example, publicly available TAXSIM version does not have direct
input variables for standard deduction and personal exemption, rather it computes them from the
variables provided as input. However, it does not have any input for primary and secondary
taxpayer’s blindness status either and computes the personal exemption and standard deduction
without taking into account blindness status. Similarly, there are other variables in SOI that are not
used as input in the publicly available TAXSIM version. In addition to this limitation, I also don’t
have the exact information of how Weber cleaned and prepared the individual SOI files and
combined them into a single file.
8
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Table 1. 1: Second-stage regression estimates for instrument selection

∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡 )

(1)
Replication
of Weber’
estimates
0.722**
(0.294)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.299***
0.685**
1.209***
(0.115)
(0.293)
(0.375)
0.147
0.151
0.0493
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1 )
(0.259)
(0.340)
(0.389)
Observations
23,438
24,731
24,731
24,731
R-squared
-0.140
0.071
-0.125
-0.262
Instruments
2 3 4 lags
0 2 3 lags
1 2 3 lags
2 3 4 lags
Diff-in-Sargan p-val
0.810
7.04e-05
0.245
0.217
First stage F-statistic
121.75
276.21,
52.40,
37.43,
46.05
39.09
39.71
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in
parentheses. The first-stage F-statistics in this table (and in all other tables in this
essay) adjust for heteroscedasticity clustered at the individual level. R-squared value
being between 0-1 is the property of OLS. However, unlike in case of OLS, R-squared
from IV regression can be negative because Residual Sum of Squared (RSS) can be
larger than Total Sum of Squares (SST) in case of IV regressions. R-squared value in
case of IV estimation is not useful as it is in case of OLS. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.

Columns 2-4 of Table 1.1 examine the exogeneity and weakness of the
instruments in the basic specification. The first stage regression estimates for
these columns of Table 1.1 are included in Table A.3 in Appendix A. Column 2 of
Table 1.1 includes instruments for current tax rate and lead tax rate constructed
based on base-year income, two-year lagged income and three-year lagged
income. First stage F-statistics from the regressions of current and lead-tax rates
are 276.21 and 46.05 respectively which are much larger than the minimum value
suggested by Stock and Yogo (2002).9 The Difference-in-Sargan test for this
column examines whether the two instruments constructed based on base-year
income are exogenous, assuming that the instruments based on two- and threeyear lagged income are exogenous. Although the instruments are not weak, the

9

For two endogenous variables and six excluded instruments, if one wants to limit the bias of IV
estimator to 5% of OLS bias, the minimum F-statistic suggested by Stock and Yogo (2002) is 15.72.
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Difference-in-Sargan p-value is close to zero; therefore, we can strongly reject the
null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous at any conventional level of
significance. Column 3 includes instruments constructed based on one-year
lagged income, two-year lagged income and three-year lagged income. The
Difference-in-Sargan p-value is 0.245, so the instruments are more plausibly
exogenous compared to those in column 2. First stage F-statistics from the
regressions of current- and lead-tax rates are 52.40 and 39.09 respectively,
suggesting that the instruments are strong. Column 4 includes instruments
constructed from two-, three- and four-year lagged income. The Difference-inSargan p-value now slightly decreases to 0.217. First stage F-statistics from the
regressions of current- and lead-tax rates are 37.43 and 39.71 respectively which
are also much larger than the minimum value suggested by Stock and Yogo
(2002). I choose the specification in column (3) (instruments constructed based on
one-, two- and three-year lagged income) as my preferred specification based on
the Difference-in-Sargan p-value and values of first-stage F-statistics. Column (3)
is my preferred specification because Difference-in-Sargan p-value is larger (i.e.,
instruments are more exogenous) and first-stage F-statistics are also larger
compared to other specifications. For the baseline specification, the coefficient on
current-tax rate is 0.69 and is significant at the 5% level whereas the coefficient on
the lead tax rate is 0.15 but this coefficient is not significant at the 10% level of
significance with large p value (p value is 0.658). These baseline results do not
provide any evidence for intertemporal adjustments.10
1.4.5 Stability of Income Controls
As is discussed previously, heterogeneous income growth poses a challenge
in estimating ETI because such heterogeneous effects are not well understood.
The recent literature addresses this issue by controlling for income as an
alternative to controlling for socio-demographic characteristics. Table 1.2
examines the stability of the estimates for various lags needed to construct these
splines. The estimates from the first stage regressions for this table are included
in Table A.4 in Appendix A.

10

I do not adjust my estimates for sample weights as my data do not have high-income oversample.
This means that all taxpayers have the same probability of being selected in the sample regardless
of the income level. Weber (2014) also doesn’t adjust for sample weights as her data do not have
high income oversample. My dataset includes 177 high-income taxpayers with missing state
information. The estimated results for the baseline specification remain unchanged when I estimate
ETI excluding those high-income taxpayers.
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Table 1. 2: Second-stage regression estimates with income controls

∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡 )
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1 )

(1)
Baseline of
Table 1.1
No Splines
0.661**
(0.282)
0.161
(0.336)
24,007
-0.119
No Spline
1, 2, 3

(2)
(3)
(4)
Base-year
1-year lagged 2-year lagged
income splines
income
income splines
splines
1.810***
0.748**
0.537
(0.458)
(0.347)
(0.329)
1.160**
0.230
0.00771
(0.454)
(0.399)
(0.380)
24,007
24,007
24,007
-0.377
-0.136
-0.097
0
1
2
1, 2, 3
1, 2, 3
1, 2, 3

Observations
R-squared
Spline lags
Lags of income for
constructing
instruments
Diff-in-Sargan p-val
0.454
0.282
0.435
0.500
First stage F53.19,
23.93,
31.90,
33.17,
statistic
39.92
27.02
26.55
27.37
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in
parentheses. The first-stage F-statistics in this table adjust for heteroscedasticity
clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 1.2 includes instruments based on income lagged one, two and three
years prior to the base year. However, columns 1-4 in Table 1.2 varies by the
number of lags used to construct income splines. Column 1 repeats the baseline
column 3 of Table 1.1 and does not include any splines. The coefficient on the
current-year tax rates is 0.661 and is significant at the 5% level whereas the
coefficient on the anticipated tax rates in imprecise. Column 2 includes income
splines based on base-year income. The coefficient on the current-year tax rates
in 1.81 and that on the future tax rates is 1.16. These estimates are much larger
than those in the current literature. However, because these splines used in
column 2 are a function of base-year income, it is unlikely that these splines will
be able to absorb heterogeneous trends. For this reason, Kopczuk (2005) uses
lagged income instead of initial year income to construct the income splines.
Weber (2014) also finds very large elasticity (2.40) for this specification. For all
these reasons, the results in column 2 are suspect. When I include income splines
constructed based on one-year lagged income (column 3), the coefficient on the
current tax rates becomes 0.75 and is significant at the 5% level, however, the
coefficient on the anticipated future tax rates is again imprecise. Column 4 includes
two-year lagged income splines. Both coefficients in column 4 are imprecise.
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1.4.6 Heterogeneity
Tax treatments generally apply to different subgroups of taxpayers
differentially. In this section, I examine heterogeneity among taxpayers based on
income and marital status in response to tax changes. Columns 1 and 2 in Table
1.3 present ETI estimates for taxpayers with broad income less than $40,000 and
larger than $40,000 respectively. Both columns include instruments based on one, two- and three-year lagged income and does not include any income splines (my
preferred specification in Table 1.1). For taxpayers with broad income less than
$40,000 (column 1), the coefficients on both current and lead tax rates are
imprecise at the 10% level of significance. Moreover, both first stage F-statistics
suggest that instruments are weak. For taxpayers with broad income larger than
$40,000 (Column 2), the coefficients on the current tax rates is 0.702 and is
significant at the 5% level. Both first stage F-statistics from this specification are
larger than suggested minimum value. These results provide evidence that higherincome taxpayers are more responsive to changes in tax rates compared to lower
income group. However, I don’t find evidence for intertemporal adjustment as the
coefficient on the lead tax rates in insignificant.

Table 1. 3: Second-stage regression estimates for heterogeneity based on
income
(1)
(2)
<40k BI
>40k BI
0.628
0.702**
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡 )
(1.083)
(0.312)
-0.479
0.509
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1 )
(1.158)
(0.373)
Observations
10,984
13,747
R-squared
-0.121
-0.155
Diff-in-Sargan p-val
0.164
0.675
Spline lags
No splines
No splines
Lags of income for constructing the instruments
1, 2, 3
1, 2, 3
First stage F-statistic
4.37,
39.27,
3.05
32.07
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in
parentheses. The first-stage F-statistics in this table adjust for heteroscedasticity
clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.4 shows the estimates for two groups based on marital status using the
preferred specification in Table 1.1. Column 1 presents estimates for single
taxpayers whereas column 2 presents estimates for married taxpayers. For single
filers, the coefficients on both current and lead tax rates are not significant whereas
the instruments are weak. For married taxpayers, the first stage F-statistics are
much larger than the minimum value suggested by Stock and Yogo (2002). The
results are in agreement with those from all previous specifications suggesting that
married taxpayers are responsive to tax changes. The results further indicate that
married tax filers are responsive to current tax changes only, but they do not adjust
income intertemporally.

Table 1. 4: Second-stage regression estimates for heterogeneity based on
marital status
(1)
(2)
Single
Married
-0.256
0.869**
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡 )
(0.503)
(0.437)
-0.707
0.430
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1 )
(0.521)
(0.486)
Observations
6,198
17,202
R-squared
0.021
-0.150
Diff-in-Sargan p-val
0.175
0.688
Spline lags
No splines
No splines
Lags of income for constructing instruments
1, 2, 3
1, 2, 3
First stage F-statistic
16.52,
32.14,
7.36
30.54
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in
parentheses. The first-stage F-statistics in this table adjust for heteroscedasticity
clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

1.4.7 Elasticity of Broad Income
As highlighted in Section 1.3, an individual taxpayer can respond to changes in
tax rates through several margins including adjustment of the amount of labor
supply, tax avoidance by changing the form and timing of compensation, tax
evasion, etc. ETI captures all these responses. For instance, a taxpayer facing an
increased tax rates may shift his/her incomes and expenditures towards tax16

favored components thereby reducing overall taxable income without altering real
behavior. Such a behavioral response affects ETI although the real behavior is
unaltered. ETI is considered to be a sufficient statistic for welfare analysis when
there are no classic and fiscal externalities. However, in case of externalities, an
elasticity of a broader definition of income is needed along with ETI. The literature
argues that some below-the-line deductions, for example, deductions for charitable
contributions, state and local taxes, home mortgage interests, etc., can create
externalities. In that light, I extend my analysis to EBI as well.

Table 1. 5: Second-stage regression estimates for elasticity of broad income
(1)
No Splines

(2)
(3)
Base-year
1-year lagged
income splines
income splines
0.186
0.739**
0.304
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡 )
(0.192)
(0.289)
(0.238)
0.122
0.604**
0.222
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1 )
(0.201)
(0.270)
(0.238)
Observations
24,937
24,937
24,937
R-squared
-0.040
-0.212
-0.073
Spline lags
No Spline
0
1
Instrument lags
1, 2, 3
1, 2, 3
1, 2, 3
Diff-in-Sargan p-val
0.872
0.572
0.857
First stage F-statistic
48.89,
24.04,
29.40,
38.81
26.55
26.93
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in
parentheses. The first-stage F-statistics in this table adjust for heteroscedasticity
clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

The primary difference between taxable income and broad income is that broad
income does not include deductions whereas taxable income does. Table 1.5
shows the estimates for EBI using different specifications. Each column in Table
1.5 includes instruments based on income lagged one, two and three years prior
to the base year. Column 1 does not include any income splines whereas columns
2 and 3 include five-piece splines constructed from base-year and one-year lagged
income respectively. The results suggest that estimates are sensitive to income
splines used in the specification. Both coefficients are significant at the 5% level
when income splines are constructed based on base-year income (Column 2).
However, for reasons explained in Section 1.4.5, these results are suspect. For
the remaining two specifications, first-stage F-statistics are larger than the
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minimum values but both the coefficients are imprecise at any conventional level
of significance. Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients
are equal to zero. The EBI estimates from all three specifications are smaller than
those in the corresponding specifications for ETI (Table 1.2).

1.5 Conclusion
This study revisits the intertemporal responses to changes in tax rates. The
results from this study provide some evidence that the estimates for intertemporal
responses to taxation in the existing literature are likely biased because the
instruments are endogenous. This study also identifies the instruments that should
yield estimates that are, at least, closer to consistent estimates compared to those
in the prior literature. For most of the specifications, estimated results do not
provide evidence for intertemporal adjustment. . The results from the specification
controlling for base-year income splines provide some weak evidence of
intertemporal adjustment, however, these estimates are suspect. The short-run
ETI in my preferred specification is 0.69 whereas estimates for EBI are much
smaller and imprecise. My short-run elasticity is larger than that found in Giertz
(2010) but smaller than the estimate found in Goolsbee (2000). Giertz (2010) and
Goolsbee (2000) provide evidence for existence of intertemporal adjustment.
However, using more exogenous instruments, my results, in general, do not
support the existence of intertemporal adjustment. Kreiner et al. (2016) provide
evidence for intertemporal shifting using Danish payroll data. However, they do not
find evidence for shifting income earned over entire year when they remove last
two months’ income before the implementation of tax reform and one month’s
income after the tax changes take place. Perhaps my results are different from
Kreiner et al. (2016) because of the differences in the nature of tax laws in two
countries. In Denmark, it is possible to report income earned from one period as
income earned in another period without violating the tax laws whereas it is not
possible in the USA. Because ETI estimates are larger than those for EBI, the
results in my study are also indicative that most of the responses of taxable income
take place through deductions. ETI may be more relevant for policymakers more
concerned about revenue-maximizing tax rates. On the other hand, EBI may be
more useful for analyzing real behavior because EBI does not include tax
avoidance behavior. Results found in this study have policy consequences. Since,
in general, I don’t find evidence for intertemporal adjustment, these results are
indicative that the actual efficiency cost of taxation may not necessarily be larger
in the long run compared to that in the short run. Therefore, policymakers may
have more flexibility in raising revenue without affecting much efficiency cost in the
long run. However, estimating the exact magnitude of optimal tax rates considering
the intertemporal responses is beyond the scope of this study and remains an area
for future research.
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CHAPTER II
DOES TAX BASE AFFECT THE BEHAVIOR OF TAXPAYERS?

2.1 Introduction
The Elasticity of Taxable Income (ETI) and the Elasticity of Broad Income (EBI)
are two central parameters of interest in tax policy analysis. Although there has
been a large body of literature addressing these policy parameters, there has been
little consensus regarding the magnitude of these parameters. The literature
recognizes that these parameters cannot be thought of independent behavioral
responses but, rather these parameters can be affected by tax policy itself.
Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) and Kopczuk (2005) provide evidence that
elasticities are larger for a tax system with a larger amount of deductions and
therefore, any changes in tax rates have a direct impact on income as well as an
indirect impact caused by the interaction between tax rates and the amount of
deductions. This implies that the behavioral responses and, therefore, the
efficiency cost of taxation can be controlled by controlling the amount of allowable
deductions. Kopczuk (2005) estimates this indirect effect of changes in tax rates
and his estimated parameter is in the order of 0.7 to 0.8. In my study, I revisit this
indirect effect of changes in tax rates using a recent estimation method developed
by Weber (2014). My estimated results support this hypothesis. The findings from
my study demonstrate that EBI is not an exogenous parameter, rather it depends
on the tax base. However, the magnitude of the tax base effect is smaller when
compared to the magnitudes in the prior literature. This finding
has significant implications on the efficiency cost of taxation. This finding implies
that the tax base has an impact on the efficiency of taxation and, therefore, any
analysis of the efficiency cost of taxation ignoring the tax base effect is incomplete.
We need to take into account both tax rates and tax base to better understand the
efficiency cost of taxation.

2.2 Literature Review
Prior research recognizes that that the behavioral responses of tax rate
changes are not independent, and external factors can influence this parameter
thereby affecting the efficiency cost of taxation. For instance, Harju and Matikka
(2016) argue that external factors such as third-party reporting can affect the
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behavioral responses of taxpayers. Keiner et al. (2014, 2016), Kleven et al. (2011)
as well as Kleven et al. (2016) also provide similar arguments. The literature has
also documented that behavioral responses can be affected by economic
conditions. Hargaden (2020) demonstrates that the behavioral responses are
smaller during the economic recession and therefore the behavioral responses are
affected by economic fluctuations. These pieces of evidence demonstrate that
behavioral responses are not exogenous parameters and, therefore, can be
affected by other external factors.
The conceptual foundation of how the tax base can affect taxable income has
been discussed in Slemrod (1995) and Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002). They argue
that a larger amount of deductions is associated with larger elasticities. This
implies that the behavioral responses can depend on allowable deductions and
therefore the efficiency cost of taxation also depends on the prevailing tax
structure. Kopczuk (2005) provides extensive empirical evidence supporting this
hypothesis. He uses tax return data to identify the direct and indirect impact of
taxation. Using an instrumental variables approach and a difference-in-differences
estimation method, he estimates the indirect elasticity of broad income with respect
to changes in net-of-tax rates in the order of 0.7 to 0.8. As discussed in the
literature, tax rates are endogenous as they are direct functions of income because
of graduated tax rates. Moreover, he also points out that the tax base can also
depend on income indirectly. This turns out that both net-of-tax-tax rates and netof-tax-tax base11 are endogenous. He addresses this endogeneity by using an
instrumental variable approach. He constructs the instruments as functions of base
year income.
As discussed in the first essay, Weber (2014) introduces a new instrument to
address the mean reversion issue widely discussed in the literature. She uses
lagged income instead of base-year income to construct the predicted net-of-tax
rate instruments. I estimate the elasticity of broad income with respect to net-oftax rates and the indirect impact of net-of-tax rates using the estimation method
developed by Weber (2014) and address the endogeneity due to the mean
reversion using instruments constructed based on lagged income. My baseline
specification includes instruments based on one-year lagged income and
examines the endogeneity of these instruments assuming that instruments
constructed from two-year and three-year lagged income are exogenous. Using
instruments based on lagged income, I find an estimate for the indirect impact of

11

Net-of-tax base is one minus the share of taxable income with respect to broad income. Net-oftax base also refers to the share of deductions with respect to broad income. Net-of-tax-base and
the share of deductions are used interchangeably in this study.
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changes in tax rates in the range of 0.07-0.12 which is significantly smaller than
those reported by Kopczuk (2005).

2.3 Data
Data used in this essay are mostly similar to those used in the first essay.
Similar to the first essay, I combine the individual SOI tax files into a panel of years
1979-1990. The estimates are primarily based on two-year differences. Moreover,
a sensitivity analysis has also been presented for one- and three-year differences.
I lose six years of observations for using two-year differences and for using
instruments constructed based on up to four-year lagged income. Therefore, the
estimation is restricted to between 1983 and 1988. The study uses broad income
for the definition of income as the dependent variable.12
In my study, I follow the definition of the net-of-tax base used by Kopczuk
(2005). Specifically, I consider all the itemized deductions, adjustments for AGI,
and reported income that are not included in AGI (Adjusted Gross Income).13
Inelastic standard deductions and personal exemptions are not included in the
definition of net of tax base. The net of tax base is then computed as the ratio of
the total of such itemized deductions, adjustments, and non-taxable reported
income with respect to broad income. All income and, deduction components are
converted into 1992 dollars using inflation indices used in Gruber and Saez (2002).
Similar to the first essay, I compute the marginal tax rates for this study using
TAXSIM (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993) developed by NBER. Data used in this study
are limited to those observations for which a taxpayer’s marital status does not
change between two years for the paired observations because a change in marital
status can cause changes in income unrelated to changes in tax rates or tax bases.
Finally, as I have done in the first essay, I exclude taxpayers whose broad income
is less than $10,000 in the base year to avoid extreme mean reversion. I include
several control variables in my estimation including indicators for marital status and
the number of dependent children in the household, a full set of state and year
dummy indicators. After imposing these restrictions, I obtain 16,184 observation
for the baseline specification. The number of observations is smaller than that in
the first essay primarily because there are observations with missing itemized
deductions. Those observations with missing deductions can still be used in the
estimations in the first essay but cannot be used in the second essay. Table B.1
presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis.

12
13

Broad income is defined in Section 1.4.2.
Reported income that are not included in AGI are also not included in the taxable income.
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2.4 Identification and Estimation
The Tax Reform Act 1986 (TRA86) was the most significant tax reform within
a thirty-year window of that decade. TRA86 not only changed the marginal tax
rates but also broadened the tax base. For instance, TRA86 reduced the
deductible portion for certain business meals and entertainment. TRA86
eliminated the adjustment for married couples when both work. It also eliminated
the deduction for personal interest (for itemizers) and eliminated the deductions
for charitable contributions made by a non-itemizer. Moreover, TRA86 changed
the treatment of moving expenses from an above-the-line adjustment to an
itemized deduction. In addition to these changes, TRA86 also changed IRA limits
and deductibility for medical and miscellaneous expenses. I use this variation
caused by TRA86 to identify the impact of changes in tax base on the behavioral
responses.
To estimate the impact of changes in tax base, I use a difference-in-differences
estimation method. My baseline specification uses two-year differences where I
make pairs of observations two years apart and regress the changes in income
between pairs of observations on changes in net-of-tax rates and changes in the
net-of-tax base along with other control variables. In the basic specification, I
investigate the impact of tax base only and use only those observations whose
marginal tax rates are unchanged across two years of the differences. For this
analysis, I estimate the following equation.
∆𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡 𝜷𝟏 + 𝛽3 ∆𝑙𝑛𝛾𝑖 𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖 𝑡

(2.1)

In equation (2.1), 𝛾𝑖 𝑡 is the share of deductions with respect to broad income
for individual 𝑖 at time period 𝑡, 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is income of individual 𝑖 at time period 𝑡 and 𝑋𝑖𝑡
represents a set of control variables used in the estimation. Then, I allow net-oftax rates to vary and extend the analysis by estimating the following two equations.
∆𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡 𝜷𝟏 + 𝛽2 ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑖 𝑡 ) + 𝛽3 ∆𝑙𝑛𝛾𝑖 𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖 𝑡
∆𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡 𝜷𝟏 + 𝛽2 ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑖 𝑡 ) + 𝛽3 ∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝛾𝑖 𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝜏𝑖 𝑡 )) + 𝜈𝑖 𝑡

(2.2)
(2.3)

Here, 𝜏𝑡 is the marginal tax rate. 𝛽3 in equation (2.2) represents the impact of
changes in net-of-tax base controlling for marginal net-of-tax rates and other
variables whereas 𝛽3 in equation (2.3) represents the impact of tax base on EBI or
the indirect impact of changes in tax rates. Kopczuk (2005) estimates equation
(2.3) using instruments constructed from base-year income and I estimate the
same equation using a method developed by Weber (2014).
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The primary focus of this study is to estimate equation (2.3). However, to
understand how the estimates vary across specifications, I also estimate equations
(2.1) and (2.2) along with (2.3). I include the interaction between net-of-tax tax
rates and net-of-tax base as well as net-of-tax rates but not the net-of-tax base
separately. The rationale for such specification has been explained in Kopczuk
(2005). Tax base matters to the taxpayers only through tax saving and, therefore,
we may not expect an independent tax base effect.
The challenge of estimating the above equation is the endogeneity of the two
explanatory variables: net-of-tax-rate and share of deductible expenses (i.e., netof-tax base). Net-of-tax-rate is a direct function of income and therefore the
exogeneity condition for identification is violated. On the other hand, some
deductions, e.g. deductions for medical and miscellaneous expenditures are also
direct functions of income and therefore subject to additional limitations. Moreover,
the net-of-tax base can indirectly depend on income. This implies that the net-oftax base is also correlated with the unobserved error term in the estimating
equation and therefore is endogenous. Kopczuk (2005) addresses this
endogeneity concern and uses an instrumental variable approach to consistently
estimate the parameter. He constructs the instrumental variables for net-of-tax
base and net-of-tax rates as functions of base-year income. However, as evident
in Weber (2014), such instruments may not guarantee the exogeneity of
instruments because these instruments are still functions of the base-year income,
which is the dependent variable of the estimating equation.
I use lagged values of income to construct the instruments for net-of-tax rates
and the share of deductible expenses. Synthetic tax rates are computed using the
TAXSIM program provided by NBER. Specifically, I compute the predicted tax
rates by running income components and other information for a lagged period
through TAXSIM for the year of interest. Similarly, I compute the predicted net-oftax base using lagged incomes.
I use a Difference-in-Sargan test to assess the endogeneity of the instruments
used in the estimation. The Difference-in-Sargan test is a test of overidentifying
restrictions that assumes a subset of instruments as exogenous and tests the
validity of suspect instruments. It checks the validity of suspect instruments by
computing the increase in Sargan’s J statistic when such suspect instruments are
added to the estimation. To test the validity of two suspect instruments for two
endogenous variables, at least three instruments are needed that are assumed to
be exogenous. This means that at least five instruments are needed to implement
the Difference-in-Sargan test in a specification with two endogenous variables. I
use three instruments for each endogenous variable with a total of six instruments.
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2.5 Empirical Results
I begin my analysis by first investigating the impact of the net-of-tax base only
while keeping tax rates constant across two years of the paired observations. For
that purpose, I estimate equation (2.1) using a limited sample. As opposed to the
full sample, this limited sample includes only those pair of observations for which
net-of-tax rates are equal across two years of the paired observations whereas the
full sample does not have such restriction and the net-of-tax rates across two years
of the paired observations in the full sample can be equal or unequal. The
estimates using the limited sample are presented in Table 2.1.

Table 2. 1: Second-stage IV regression estimates using net-of-tax base
only
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.0709***
0.0699***
0.0683***
(0.0121)
(0.0119)
(0.0118)
Observations
2,226
2,226
2,226
R-squared
-0.065
-0.063
-0.060
Instruments
0 2 3 lags
1 2 3 lags
2 3 4 lags
First stage F-statistic
2391
2217
2289
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in
parentheses. The first-stage F-statistics in this table (and in all other tables in this
essay) adjust for heteroscedasticity clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
∆𝑙𝑛(𝜸)

Columns 1-3 of Table 2.1 present estimates using instruments of different
lagged values. The first stage regression estimates for these columns of Table 2.1
are included in Table B.2 in Appendix B. The weakness of the instruments is
examined by comparing the F-statistics from the first stage regressions with the
minimum F-statistic suggested by Stock and Yogo (2002). The endogeneity of the
instruments is examined by observing the p-value of the Difference-in-Sargan test.
The null hypothesis of this test is that the suspect instrument(s) is(are) exogenous.
The first stage F-statistic is large for each column implying that the instruments are
strong. However, the Difference-in-Sargan p-value is not reported for all three
columns because estimates in these three columns are based on only a small
number of observations in the limited sample which includes a restriction that
marginal net-of-tax rates are equal across two years of the paired observations.
Hence, I do not have any information regarding the endogeneity of the instruments
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used in this table. However, in the subsequent tables, I remove this constraint, and
as a result, I end up with a larger number of observations which are sufficient to
compute the Different-in-Sargan p-value. Column (1) in Table 2.1 presents the
estimates using the instruments for net-of-tax base constructed as a function of
base-year income as well as the income of two- and three-year lags. Column (2)
presents estimates using instruments with one-, two- and three-year lagged
income. Column (3) presents estimates using instruments with two-, three- and
four-year lagged income. In all three specifications, the coefficient on the net of tax
base is positive and significant at the 1% level. The magnitudes are similar and in
the order of 0.07 in all three columns.
Estimates in Table 2.1 are based on a limited sample where tax rates are
unchanged across years of the paired observations. Table 2.2 eliminates this
constraint and utilizes the full sample to estimate equation (2.2) which includes
net-of-tax base and net-of-tax rates in the estimating equation.

Table 2. 2: Second stage regression estimates for the IV regression with net-oftax rates and net-of-tax base
(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)
-0.214*
0.203
-0.0320
(0.112)
(0.201)
(0.219)
0.106***
0.105***
0.106***
0.105***
∆𝑙𝑛(𝜸)
(0.00685)
(0.00666)
(0.00705)
(0.00682)
Observations
16,184
16,184
16,184
16,184
R-squared
-0.124
-0.052
-0.198
-0.112
Instruments
0 2 3 lags
0 2 3 lags
1 2 3 lags
2 3 4 lags
Diff-in-Sargan p-val
0.140
0.0485
0.862
0.366
First stage F-statistic
231, 4253
61, 4169
56, 4158
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in
parentheses. The first-stage F-statistics in this table adjust for heteroscedasticity clustered
at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉)

I present column 1 in Table 2.2 to compare the results with those in Table 2.1.
Column 1 in Table 2.1 and column 1 in Table 2.2 are based on the same
specification but use different samples. Columns 2-4 of Table 2.2 examine the
endogeneity and weakness of the instruments. The first stage regression
estimates for this Table 2.2 are included in Table B.3 in Appendix B. Column 2 of
Table 2.2 includes instruments for net-of-tax rates and net-of-tax base constructed
based on base-year income, two-year lagged income and three-year lagged
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income. First stage F-statistics from the regressions of net-of-tax rates and net-oftax base are 231 and 4253 respectively which are much larger than the minimum
value suggested by Stock and Yogo14 (2002). The Difference-in-Sargan test for
this column examines whether the instruments for the two endogenous variables
constructed based on base-year income are exogenous, assuming that the
instruments based on two-year and three-year lagged income are exogenous.
Although the instruments are not weak, the Difference-in-Sargan p-value is close
to zero; therefore, we can strongly reject the null hypothesis that the instruments
are exogenous. Column 3 includes instruments constructed based on one-year
lagged income, two-year lagged income, and three-year lagged income. The
Difference-in-Sargan p-value is 0.86, and therefore the instruments are more
exogenous when constructed from one-, two- and three-year lagged income
compared to those when constructed from base-year income, two-year lagged
income and three-year lagged income. First stage F-statistics from the regressions
of net-of-tax rates and net-of-tax base are 61 and 4169 respectively, suggesting
that the endogeneity of the instruments is not a concern. Column 4 includes
instruments constructed from two-year, three-year and four-year lagged income.
While the instruments are strong according to the guidelines suggested by Stock
and Yogo (2002), the Difference-in-Sargan p-value now decreases to 0.37. My
preferred specification in Table 2.2 is that of column 3 for which the Diff-in-Sargan
p-value is larger implying that instruments are more exogenous compared to those
in the other two columns, and the first stage F-statistic is also large implying the
instruments are strong. The coefficient on the net-of-tax rates is 0.20 and is not
significant whereas the coefficient on the net-of-tax base is 0.11 and is significant
at the 1% level. These results support the finding from Table 2.1, however, the
magnitude of the coefficient on the net-of-tax base is slightly larger.
Estimated results from the IV regression with net-of-tax rates and the
interaction are presented in Table 2.3. The first stage regression estimates for this
table are included in Table B.4 in Appendix B. Columns 1-3 of Table 2.3 examine
the endogeneity and weakness of the instruments. First stage F-statistics from all
three columns imply strong instruments. A comparison of the Diff-in-Sargan pvalues provides findings similar to the ones in Table 2.1. Instruments are more
exogenous when they are constructed based on one-, two- and three-year lagged
income (column 2). Column 2 is my preferred specification and the estimated
results for this specification suggest that the coefficient on the net-of-tax rates is
positive but insignificant. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive and
significant at any conventional level of significance and its magnitude is 0.11. This

14

For two endogenous variables and six excluded instruments, if one wants to limit the bias of IV
estimator to 5% of OLS bias, the minimum F-statistic suggested by Stock and Yogo (2002) is 15.72.
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simply means that for individuals with share of deductions equal to one, the indirect
impact of broad income with respect to changes in net-of-tax rates is 0.11.
Tax return data include rich information on incomes and deductions but limited
socio-demographic information. As highlighted in the literature, the existence of
heterogeneous income growth can cast doubt on the validity of the estimated
results because such heterogeneous growth is not well understood. Controlling for
income as an alternative to controlling for socio-demographic information is a
common approach in the literature. Table B.5 presents results for specifications
including five-piece income splines constructed from different lagged values of
income. The results are similar to the ones obtained from the preferred
specifications in Table 2.3. In all columns, the first stage F-statistic is large. Except
for column 2, estimate for the direct impact of changes in net-of-tax rates are small,
positive, and insignificant in all specifications. The estimate for the indirect effect
of changes in net-of-tax rate is strongly significant in all specifications and is robust
to the inclusion of different income splines.

Table 2. 3: Second stage regression estimates from the IV regression with net-oftax rates and the interaction
(1)
(2)
(3)
-0.319***
0.0972
-0.137
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉)
(0.112)
(0.201)
(0.219)
0.105***
0.106***
0.105***
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉))
(0.00666)
(0.00705)
(0.00682)
Observations
16,184
16,184
16,184
R-squared
-0.052
-0.198
-0.112
Instruments
0 2 3 lags
1 2 3 lags
2 3 4 lags
Diff-in-Sargan p-val
0.0485
0.862
0.366
First stage F-statistic
231, 3257
62, 3178
56, 3178
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in
parentheses. The first-stage F-statistics in this table adjust for heteroscedasticity
clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

My last step of analysis includes examining the estimates with different
difference lengths. Table B.7 presents such results and considers one-, two- and
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three-year difference lengths.15 For the one-year differences specification, the
estimate for the direct impact of changes in net-of-tax rates is 0.374 and is
significant at the 10% level whereas the estimate for the indirect impact is strongly
significant and is smaller (the magnitude is 0.07) compared to the ones from the
previously discussed two-year differences specifications. In the case of three-year
differences specification, the estimate for the direct impact is now negative (-0.997)
and is significant at the 10% level of significance. The coefficient on the interaction
term is significant at any conventional level and is slightly larger than the ones from
the two-year differences specifications. The results are, in general, consistent with
the previously obtained results and suggest much a smaller indirect impact as
compared to the one in the prior literature.
The estimated results from all the specifications support the claim that tax
elasticity is not an exogenous parameter, rather it depends on the net of tax base.
To better understand the behavioral responses, I run a join significance test for the
coefficients on the net of tax rates and the interaction term. I find both the
coefficients are jointly significant at 1% level of significance. I compute the total tax
elasticity by plugging the values of 𝛄 in estimated coefficients. I find the tax
elasticity at the average net of tax base as 0.12. Moreover, depending on the value
of 𝛄, tax elasticity varies between 0.09 to 0.26.
The estimated coefficient on the interaction term is largely different from that in
Kopczuk (2005). One of the differences between Kopczuk’s model and the model
used in my study is how the interaction term between the net-of-tax rates and the
tax base is defined. I define the interaction as ∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝛾𝑖 𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝜏𝑖 𝑡 )) whereas
Kopczuk (2005) defines it as ∆(𝛾𝑖 𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑖 𝑡 )). This means that there is a
difference because of the scale change. However, to understand the other sources
of differences, I estimate equation (2.3) using Kopczuk’s (2005) baseline
specification and using his definition. Kopczuk (2005) uses three-years differences
and his baseline specification includes instruments for net-of-tax rates and the
interaction term based on base-year information. I start with his baseline
specification and make changes to specifications to arrive at my specification with
three-year differences (column 3 of Table B.7). Table 2.4 presents the estimated
results for such an analysis. Column (1) presents estimates using Kopczuk’s
(2005) specification and his definition of the interaction. This column includes
instruments based on base-year income, two-year lagged income and three-year
lagged income as well as income splines based on one-year lagged income. The
estimate reported in his study for this specification is 0.79 whereas my replicated
estimate is 0.30. My replicated estimate is largely different from his reported

15

The number of observations is different for different columns in this table because I lose one
additional year of observations for each additional year in the difference length.
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estimate. However, it is noteworthy that the coefficient on the interaction term
changes significantly as I increase lags of income for constructing the instruments.

Table 2. 4: Understanding the sources of differences from Kopczuk (2005)
Net-of-tax rates
Interaction
between tax rate
and tax base

(1)
-0.909***
(0.232)
0.295***

(2)
-1.484
(0.910)
0.623*

(3)
-4.665**
(1.960)
0.293*

(4)
8.488
(9.374)
0.092***

(5)
-1.205
(1.127)
0.087***

(0.055)
(0.349)
(0.164)
(0.020)
(0.008)
Observations
13,086
13,086
13,086
3,279
4,823
R-squared
0.028
-0.083
-0.285
-4.343
-0.038
Lags of income for 0 2 3 lags 1 2 3 lags 2 3 4 lags 1 2 3 lags 1 2 3 lags
constructing
instruments
Lags of income for
1 lag
1 lag
1 lag
1 lag
No spline
constructing
splines
First stage F
101, 35
10, 19
7, 2
0.6, 2539 11, 3106
statistics
Diff-in-Sargan p-val
0.324
0.493
0.0172
0.878
0.344
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Column (2) includes instruments based on one-, two-, three-year lagged
income while keeping splines and other information unchanged from those of
columns (1). Instruments are now more exogenous while first-stage F-statistics are
still larger than the minimum value for 10% of OLS bias suggested by Stock and
Yogo (2002). For this specification, the coefficient on the interaction term now
increases to 0.623 and is significant at the 10% level of significance. Column (3)
includes instruments based on two-, three- and four-year lagged income, as well
as income splines based on one-year lagged income. However, the instruments
are now weak. Column (4) uses the same specification as that in column (2) but
uses the definition of the interaction term used in my study instead of the one used
in Kopczuk (2005). Therefore, column (4) uses the same specification as in column
(2) but a different definition of the interaction term and different sample. The
coefficient is now much smaller. This suggests that much of the difference can be
explained by the difference in the definition and the sample. The instruments are
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now weak. Column (5) uses the instruments based on one-, two-, and three-year
lagged income as well as the same definition of the interaction term as that in
column (4) but does not include any income splines. The specification in this
column is similar to that used in column (3) of Table B.7. The first stage F-statistics
are now larger than the suggested minimum value. A comparison between
columns (2) and (5) suggests that much of the difference is caused by the
difference in the definition of the interaction term. However, looking at columns 1,
2 and 3, it is also suggestive that the number of lags of income used to construct
the instruments is also an important factor in determining the magnitude of the
estimate. The coefficient largely varies as the number of lags to construct the
instruments changes. Although the definitions of the interaction term are different,
this difference should not matter when it comes to computing the overall elasticity.
Having said that, the use of suitable instrument is needed for consistently
estimating the elasticities. This implies that, because my estimation is based on
plausibly more exogenous instruments, the results in my study provide some
improvement over those in the prior literature.

2.6 Conclusion
The present study revisits the direct and indirect impact of changes in tax rates
using a recent estimation method. In most of the specifications, the estimate for
the direct impact is of the order of 0 to 0.37 and is insignificant. On the other hand,
the indirect impact is strongly significant (at the 1% level) for all the specifications
considered. Its value is also very much consistent across specifications with the
value ranging between 0.102-0.106 for the specifications with two-year
differences. The estimated indirect impact is strongly significant in the case of
specifications with one-year differences as well, however, its magnitude is smaller
(0.07). Similar to all other specifications, the estimated indirect impact is significant
at the 1% level in the case of three-year differences, but its magnitude (0.123) is
slightly larger than that in two-year differences. The estimated direct impact is, in
general, in line with the prior literature. However, the estimated indirect impact is
largely different from that of the prior literature. Kopczuk (2005) reports a large
indirect impact of the order of 0.7 to 0.8 implying large efficiency cost of taxation
through tax base. However, my study provides strong evidence that the indirect
efficiency cost of taxation may not necessarily be as large as suggested by the
present literature. These findings imply that EBI is not an exogenous parameter,
rather it depends on the tax base. These findings have significant implications on
the efficiency cost of taxation. These findings imply that the tax base has an impact
on the efficiency of taxation and, therefore, any analysis of the efficiency cost of
taxation ignoring the tax base effect is incomplete. We need to take into account
both tax rates and tax base to better understand the efficiency cost of taxation.
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CHAPTER III
THE CAPITALIZATION EFFECT OF SCHOOL COMPETITION ON
HOME PRICES

3.1 Introduction
Theoretical residential sorting models argue that individuals value local public
services and therefore choose their residential location according to the public
services available in geographical regions. Their choice reflects how they value
public services available in those geographical regions. One such public service is
school quality. Parents care about the education quality available in regions and
this concern translates into higher values of residential property in those regions.
However, increased competition for enrollment provides students with
opportunities to transfer to the school of their choice without having to change their
residence. Therefore, school choice weakens the link between school quality and
residential property value. My study examines the connection between increased
school competition and property values. Specifically, this study empirically
examines the possible linkages between (1) school competition and the distribution
of home prices within the county, and (2) school competition and median home
prices. This study provides evidence that an increase in school competition is
associated with an overall increase in home value within the county. Moreover, this
study also provides evidence that an increase in school competition is associated
with a decrease in variability in home values within the county, however, these
findings are sensitive to fixed effects and time trends included in the specifications.
This study proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 presents a conceptual framework
for linkages between (1) school competition and the distribution of home prices
within the county, and (2) school competition and median home prices; Section 3.3
describes the existing literature; Section 3.4 describes the data used in the study;
Section 3.5 presents the empirical methods; Section 3.6 presents the results
obtained in the study; and Section 3.7 presents the conclusion of the study.
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3.2 Conceptual Framework
Consider two school districts: a good school district and a bad one.16 The
services from the good school district are more valuable to parents than those from
the bad one. Initially, the state does not adopt open enrollment and thereby one’s
school attendance zone is a hard default. In such a case, it is likely that home
prices are higher in good school districts and lower in bad ones (Black 1999,; and
Figlio and Lucas 2004). After the adoption of open enrollment, attendance zones
are no longer relevant, and parents are no longer restricted to attendance zones.
Parents now have the option to choose any school from the good and the bad
school districts regardless of their residential locations. Because houses are more
expensive and schools are better in good school districts, parents in a bad school
district will maximize their utility by sending their children to the schools in the good
district where services are better while continuing to live in the bad school district
where houses are cheaper. The empirical analyses in this paper are based on the
following assumptions:
•
•
•
•

Transportation costs to/from schools are negligible;
Families are well-informed about the exact services provided by the schools,
recent school choice reform initiatives by the states and the home prices;
In the absence of school choice, the attendance zone is a hard default and
difficult to opt out of; and
Alternatives to traditional public schools (magnet, charter and private schools)
are as good as “good” public schools.

The adoption of open enrollment is associated with the change in residential
property value in the two districts. Residents in the bad school district are now
enjoying better services provided by the schools in the good school district while
maintaining the same residential area with cheaper house prices. This, in turn,
implies that residences in the bad school district are now more valuable after the
adoption of open enrollment than they were before the adoption of open
enrollment. On the other hand, demand for homes in the good school district
decreases after adoption of open enrollment. The changes in the relative valuation
for homes between the two school districts will lead to changes in market prices
for homes in those districts. One should expect home prices in bad school districts

16

Good and bad school districts are defined based on the aspects that the parents care about and
expect from schools.
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to increase weakly17 whereas home prices in the good school district should
decrease weakly. This relative change in home prices influences the distribution
of home prices across two districts. In addition to affecting the relative home prices
of the two districts, the adoption of open enrollment also increases the competition
for enrollment among schools as parents now have the freedom to choose a school
from neighboring districts as well. The adoption of open enrollment should,
therefore, reduce the inequality in home prices across two districts and increase
school competition. With adoption of open enrollment, the residents have more
freedom of sending their children to the schools of their choice. Thus, overall
satisfaction of the residents of the combined region of the two districts should
increase, leading to an increase in overall home prices.
This story extends to school choice among traditional public, charter, magnet,
and private schools as well. The introduction of alternatives to traditional public
school allows parents to choose a school among four different types of schools
anywhere within the county and the relative home prices will be affected among
the areas with varying school quality within the county in a similar manner as in the
case of open enrollment. I use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index18 (HHI) for
enrollment among four different types of schools to represent school competition.
A lower value of HHI is associated with less concentrated enrollment which in turn
represents a greater choice for parents in selecting a school for their children and
vice versa. I provide a precise definition of HHI in a later section. It might be
possible that there is only one type of school within the county when the value of
HHI is at its maximum of HHI=10000. The way HHI for enrollment is defined, the
minimum concentration and thereby maximum choice might be possible when
there is equal enrollment among all four types of schools and this case will be
represented by HHI=4*25^2=2500. Based on the assumptions and conceptual
analyses described above, the following hypotheses are drawn:
Hypothesis 1: Less concentrated counties will have less variability in home prices.
Hypothesis 2: If households value school choice, less concentrated counties will
have higher median home prices.

17

Quality of services at schools in a good school district as perceived by residents in a bad school
district may be higher or equal to the perceived quality of services at schools in bad school districts.
18 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is defined as the sum of squares of enrollment shares for four
different types of schools within the county.

33

3.3 Literature Review
Considering its importance, there has been a substantial discussion in the
literature regarding the linkage between school quality and property values as well
as other welfare measures. Black (1999) investigates parental valuation for good
schools using a school attendance zone boundary approach. She uses a
regression discontinuity design based on the data on both sides of school
attendance zones in Massachusetts to estimate the impact of test scores on home
prices. This study assumes that residential houses near the boundaries of school
attendance zones are expected to have similar neighborhood characteristics
thereby reducing the possibility of bias resulting from omitted neighborhood
characteristics. Her results show that a one percent increase in test scores results
in a 0.5 percent increase in home prices. Figlio and Lucas (2004) address the
question of whether the state-administered grades assigned to schools have any
influence on house prices as well as on residential location. They use data on
repeated sales on individual residential properties in Florida and found that school
grades impact house prices and residential locations, however, they also found
that these estimated effects diminish over time. Dhar and Ross (2012) address a
similar question by examining differences across school district boundaries rather
than those across attendance zones. Based on the data from Connecticut, they
found a significant positive effect of test scores on property values. Reback (2005)
examines the effect of public-school choice reforms on house prices. Using data
on inter-district choice from Minnesota, he finds that school districts with the net
exit of students to neighboring districts experience home price increases whereas
net student inflow is associated with a decrease in home prices. His estimation
results show that the magnitude of the effect for student outflow is larger than the
magnitude of the effect for student inflow. Based on this comparison he concludes
that the net welfare impact of the expansion of school choice is positive, even
though the difference between the magnitudes of effects for incoming and outgoing
transfer rates is not statistically significant. Other related works include those by
Brunner et al., (2012), Schwartz et al., (2014) and Chung (2015). These related
papers, in general, investigate the effects of outflow and inflow of students, as a
result of school choice reforms, on the residential property value as well as on the
residential location. They find that the effect of the expanded school choice on low
performing geographical regions (as defined by school districts or school zones) is
positive and vice versa.
There are a few companion studies in the literature that are most relevant for
my study. For example, Reback (2005) addresses the question of school choice
reform and evaluates the expanded school choice in terms of effects for inflow and
outflow of students. Other related works by Brunner et al., (2012), Schwartz et al.,
(2014) and Chung (2015) also follow Reback (2005) by evaluating school choice
in terms of the effects of inflow and outflow of students on home value. Reback
(2005) and Brunner et al., (2012) find that initially “low-quality” districts experience
a net outflow of students and an increase in home value whereas initially “high34

quality” districts experience a net inflow of students and a decrease in home value.
These patterns of student mobility, in turn, reduce the inequality of home values.
None of these studies explicitly investigate and empirically test a direct relation
between school choice and the inequality of home prices. Moreover, the findings
from these studies are based on smaller geographical regions. There is no
evidence that the findings from these studies based on smaller geographic regions
generalize to the entire country. My study adds to the literature by examining the
relationships between (1) school competition and the distribution of home prices
within the county, and (2) school competition and median home prices. In addition,
in contrast to the previous literature, I utilize data representing the entire country.
A strong set of control variables on demographic as well as housing characteristics
is utilized to estimate the model. Utilizing county-level data, this study provides
evidence that an expanded school competition is associated with an increase in
home value. Moreover, this study also provides evidence that an expanded school
competition is associated with a decrease in variability in home value within a
county, however, this finding is sensitive to sample size and to controls for
unobserved heterogeneity included in the specifications.

3.4 Data
The dataset for this study includes county-level panel data for four years (2010,
2012, 2014 and 2016) with 819 counties from all over the US. Data are collected
from two different sources: the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES)
and American Community Survey (ACS) by the U.S. Census Bureau.19 Data
collected from NCES are school-level data on enrollment into all traditional public,
charter, magnet and private schools. These school-level data on enrollment are
then used to compute the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for enrollment among
four different types of schools within each county, therefore, school level

19

Data are collected from the following tables:
U.S. Census Bureau; American Community Survey,
Estimates, Tables s2506, CP04 and DP05;
<http://factfinder2.census.gov>; (11 May 2019)
U.S. Census Bureau; American Community Survey,
Estimates, Tables s2506, CP04 and DP05;
<http://factfinder2.census.gov>; (11 May 2019)
U.S. Census Bureau; American Community Survey,
Estimates, Tables s2506, CP04 and DP05;
<http://factfinder2.census.gov>; (11 May 2019)
U.S. Census Bureau; American Community Survey,
Estimates, Tables s2506, CP04 and DP05;
<http://factfinder2.census.gov>; (11 May 2019)
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2010 American Community Survey 1-Year
generated using American FactFinder;
2012 American Community Survey 1-Year
generated using American FactFinder;
2014 American Community Survey 1-Year
generated using American FactFinder;
2016 American Community Survey 1-Year
generated using American FactFinder;

observations are converted into county-level data. The HHI measure serves as a
proxy for school competition within each county. HHI for school enrollment is
defined as:
𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ∑𝑖 𝑠 2

(3.1)

Here 𝑖 represents the type of school and 𝑠 represents the share of enrollment
for school type. Based on the definition of HHI for enrollment, HHI is bounded
between a minimum of 2500 and a maximum of 10000. A lower value of HHI
represents less concentrated enrollment which further implies a greater choice for
parents in selecting a school for their children and vice versa.
Data on home value and other socio-demographic information are collected
from three different tables (s2506, CP04, and DP05) of ACS 1-year estimates by
U.S. Census Bureau. The unit of observation for each of these data tables is the
county. Table DP04 contains the distributional data on home prices, among other
information. These distributional data have been used to construct the Gini
coefficient for home values. Gini coefficient for home value is a measure of
dispersion for home value within the county and is one of the two dependent
variables of interest. The definition of the Gini coefficient is given in equation (3.2).
𝐺=

𝑛
∑𝑛
𝑖=1 ∑𝑗=1 |𝑥𝑖 −𝑥𝑗 |
𝑛
2 ∑𝑛
𝑖=1 ∑𝑗=1 𝑥𝑗

(3.2)

In the above definition, 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑥𝑗 are individual home values. There are certain
advantages of Gini coefficient that makes it a preferred choice over other
measures (standard deviation or variance) to represent dispersion. First, Gini
coefficient is a more generalized form of measure for dispersion. Moreover, it is
not only invariant to the scale of observations but also bounded. One can analyze
extreme cases (Gini=0 representing perfect equality and Gini=10,000 representing
perfect inequality) with the help of Gini coefficient which is not possible using other
measures. In this study, Gini coefficient for home value is bounded20 between a
minimum of 0 and a maximum of 10,000. Table for data on HHI from NCES and
all three tables from ACS contain county names and state names. The combination
of county and state names is unique in each dataset. This unique combination of
county and state names is used to combine all the individual data sets to obtain a

20

To maintain consistency in scale with other variables expressed in percentages, Gini Coefficient
is measured in percentage squares and bounded between a minimum of 0 and a maximum of
10,000. This scale of the Gini coefficient used in this paper contrasts the conventional value of Gini
coefficient bounded between 0 and 1.
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single merged data set. The summary statistics for the combined data set are
shown in Table C.1.

3.5 Estimation Method
Figures 1-4 provide a visualization of the linkages examined in this study.
Figure 1 and 2 illustrate the unconditional relation between HHI and the median
home price for 2010 and 2016 respectively. These two figures display a weakly
discernable negative correlation between the two variables. Figure 3 and 4 show
scatter plots for the relation between school competition and the Gini coefficient of
home prices for 2010 and 2016 respectively. These two scatter plots display a very
subtle positive relation between school competition and the inequality of home
prices.21
To provide empirical evidence concerning whether these relations hold, I
estimate the following equation (3.3) with Pooled OLS regression:
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ ℎℎ𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖

(3.3)

In the equation (3.3), 𝑌𝑖 represents two dependent variables of interest: median
home prices and variability of home prices as measured by the Gini coefficient for
home prices. The independent variable of interest is HHI and the coefficient of
interest is 𝛽1 . X represents a vector of control variables. This set of controls include
data on demographic as well as housing characteristics.

21

Years 2012 and 2014 are not displayed for brevity. However, the scatter plots for those two years
also have similar patterns.
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Figure 1: Home value vs HHI: 2010

Figure 2: Home value vs HHI: 2016

Figure 3: Gini-coefficient vs HHI: 2010

Figure 4: Gini-coefficient vs HHI: 2016

38

As reported in the literature, one of the challenges in estimating the
capitalization effect of school competition on home value arises because the
school competition may be correlated with unobserved neighborhood
characteristics such as crime rate, other public services available within the
geographical unit, demographic compositions, etc. Although the dataset includes
a rich set of sociodemographic control variables, regressing the property values
on other independent and control variables can result in biased estimates because
of such correlation between the school competition and unobserved neighborhood
characteristics. Such unobserved neighborhood characteristics that are invariant
with respect to time for a geographical unit can be removed for by adding
geographical unit-specific fixed effects. The estimation equation including such
fixed effects is as below:
𝑌𝑖 𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛽1 ∗ ℎℎ𝑖𝑖 𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑋𝑖 𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 𝑡

(3.4)

In equation (3.4), 𝜃𝑖 represents county-specific time-invariant effects. In the
following sections, I estimate equation (3.4) using both fixed effects and random
effects model and compare the results.
Estimates including county-specific fixed effects rely on the assumption that
there are no inter-county movements for attending schools. However, it is
reasonably likely that parents living near the border of two counties may want to
send their children to a school located outside of their own county of residence in
order for their children to obtain better schooling. In this case, the identification
assumption is violated. To address this concern, I extend the analysis by including
metropolitan area-specific fixed effects instead of county-specific fixed effects. For
such analysis, equation (3.4) is estimated, however, in this case, 𝜃𝑖 represents
metropolitan area-specific time-invariant fixed effects. These estimates
considering metropolitan area fixed effects remain valid if students do not attend a
school located outside of their own metropolitan area of residence.
Including county-specific fixed effects controls for time-invariant unobserved
characteristics of counties. However, concerns remain about the unobserved
characteristics that change over time, where county-specific fixed effects are
unable to absorb such unobserved characteristics. These unobserved timevarying characteristics can also lead to bias in the estimates. To address such
concern, I test the robustness of estimates by relaxing the assumption of time
invariance in the characteristics of geographical units and by absorbing any linear
time-varying unobserved characteristics by including county-specific linear time
trends in the estimation. With county-specific linear time trends, the estimation
equation takes the following form:
𝑌𝑖 𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑖 𝑡 + 𝛽1 ∗ ℎℎ𝑖𝑖 𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑋𝑖 𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 𝑡
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(3.5)

3.6 Results

3.6.1 The Effect of School Competition on Median Home Value
Table 3.1 presents the estimates for the effect of school competition on median
home prices. Column 1 includes estimates from Pooled OLS regression without
any control variables. The coefficient on HHI is -16.06 and is significant at the 1%
level. The estimated results suggest that for one unit decrease in concentration
(∆HHI = -1), home price increases by 16.06 dollars which is 0.01 % at the median.
The estimated coefficient on HHI in equation (3.3) using Pooled OLS including
control variables is -5.251 (column 2). The point estimate is significant at the 1%
level. This result suggests that one unit decrease in HHI is associated with an
increase in home value by $5.25 which is a 0.003% at the median. To interpret this
result, consider the case when a county goes from fully concentrated enrollment
(HHI=10000 with no competition for school enrollment) to fully unconcentrated
enrollment (HHI=0 with maximum school competition). This means that initially the
county does not adopt open enrollment in which case the attendance zone is a
hard default and difficult to opt-out of and there is no school competition, and then
the county adopts an open enrollment in which case the student is fully flexible to
choose any school within that county and the school competition is maximum.
Such a change in enrollment is associated with an increase in home value by
$52,510. This increase in home value represents a 26.50% increase at the median.
The OLS estimate in column 2 relies on the assumption that the unobserved
error is uncorrelated with school competition which is very strong assumption.
Columns 3 and 4 show the estimates using fixed effects and random effects
models respectively recognizing county-specific fixed effects. My preferred
specification is fixed effects model. The underlying assumption for the random
effects model is that county specific unobserved characteristics are uncorrelated
with HHI which is very strong assumption. Although the dataset contains sociodemographic information, variables included in the dataset may not be sufficient
to absorb the unobserved county specific characteristics. If the county specific
unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with HHI, the random effects model will
produce inconsistent estimates. Fixed effects model relaxes such assumption and
can produce consistent estimate when HHI is correlated with unobserved
heterogeneity. Hausman test results also suggest that the fixed effects model is
appropriate (p-value from the Hausman test is 0). Column 3 presents the estimated
results from fixed effects model. The coefficient on HHI of school enrollment is 2.999 and is significant at the 1% level. These estimates support the hypothesis
that a decrease in concentration is associated with an increase in home value
where a one unit decrease in concentration of enrollment is associated with an
increase in home value by 0.002% at the median.
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Table 3. 1: Estimates for regression of home value using full sample

HHI

(1)
OLS - No
Control
-16.06***
(1.304)
3,250
0.050

(2)
OLS Controlled
-5.251***
(0.580)
3,165
0.891

(3)
FE

(4)
RE

-2.999***
-4.924***
(0.676)
(0.629)
Observations
3,165
3,165
R-squared
0.433
Number of counties
819
819
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The
coefficients on control variables are not listed in this (and subsequent) table
(tables) for brevity.

A careful examination of the values of HHI for enrollments shows that not every
panel unit has enough within-county variation in HHI across years. To avoid the
fact that panel units with low within-county variation may affect the estimates and
to confirm that the results are based on enough variation in HHI across years, I
identify the counties for the largest 50 percent within-county variation in absolute
value in HHI across years and create a new sample of observations which
experience the largest 50 percent swing in within-county variation in HHI across
years. This limited sample consists of a balanced panel data set for 669 counties.
The results based on this limited sample are shown in Table 3.2. With the new
limited sample, the sign of the coefficients on HHI from Pooled OLS, fixed effects
as well as random effects models remains unchanged (negative) and are,
therefore, in agreement with the hypothesis. The estimates from all the
specifications are precise at the 5% or lower level of significance.22
The estimates presented so far rely on the assumption that the observations
are homoscedastic. However, Breusch-Pagan as well as White test for
heteroskedasticity suggests a strong rejection of no heteroskedasticity. To
examine the direction and magnitude of the coefficients and the magnitude of
standard errors recognizing heteroskedasticity, heteroskedasticity-robust

22

The data fail to meet the asymptotic assumption for Hausman Test, so it is not possible to
determine which model is appropriate.
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estimates are obtained considering clusters at the county level. Columns 1-3 of
Table 3.3 present heteroskedasticity-robust estimates. Consistent with previously
estimated coefficients, the sign of the coefficients is unchanged suggesting that a
decrease in the concentration of enrollments is associated with an increase in
home value. The coefficients from Pooled OLS, fixed effects, and random effects
specifications are significant at the 1% level.

Table 3. 2: Estimates for regression of home value using limited sample
(1)
No Control
-15.81***
(1.996)
1,627
0.046

(2)
OLS - Controlled
-4.838***
(0.839)
1,591
0.898

(3)
FE
HHI
-2.287**
(0.896)
Observations
1,591
R-squared
0.437
Number of counties
669
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

(4)
RE
-4.555***
(0.797)
1,591
669

Heteroskedasticity-robust estimates with clusters at the county levels are also
obtained with the limited sample of 669 counties that have the largest 50 percent
swing in within-county variation in HHI across years. The results based on this
limited sample are shown in Table C.2. With the new limited sample, coefficients
from Pooled OLS and fixed effects models are -4.838 and -2.287 respectively and
are both significant at the 1% level.

Table 3. 3: Estimates for regression of home value using full sample with
cluster at county level
(1)
OLS
-5.251***
(0.919)
3,165
0.891

(2)
(3)
FE
RE
HHI
-2.999***
-4.924***
(0.700)
(0.765)
Observations
3,165
3,165
R-squared
0.433
Number of counties
819
819
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the county are in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The estimates presented so far include fixed effects at the county level. The
estimates considering county-specific fixed effects rely on the assumption that
students attend schools within the county of their residence. However, it is possible
that parents near the border of two counties send their children to a school on the
other side of the border in order for their children to obtain better schooling. In such
a case, the identification assumption is violated. I address this concern by reestimating equation (3.4) including metropolitan area-specific fixed effects instead
of county-specific fixed effects. The estimates are shown in Table 3.4. The results
reiterate the negative relation between the concentration of enrollments and home
value. Specifically, the coefficient on HHI of enrollments from OLS and random
effects are -2.581 and -2.934 respectively and are significant at the 5% and 1%
levels respectively.
The final step of analysis involves including county-specific linear time trends.
Fixed effects included in the previous estimates are time-invariant and are,
therefore, unable to absorb any characteristics that change over time. Countyspecific linear time trend can absorb unobserved county-specific characteristics
that vary linearly over time. Such estimated coefficients of equation (3.5) are
presented in Table C.3. Consistent with the hypothesis, the coefficient on HHI of
enrollment is again negative. However, the coefficient is now imprecise at the 10%
level. The fact that the estimates are imprecise when I absorb county specific linear
time trends are suggestive that HHI may be correlated with the unobserved linear
time trends.

Table 3. 4: Estimates for regression of home value with metropolitan
area level data (clustered at metro level)
(1)
OLS
-2.581**
(1.221)
309,039**
(132,142)
1,327
0.881

(2)
(3)
FE
RE
HHI of school enrollment
-0.916
-2.934***
(1.070)
(1.041)
Constant
77,235
6,793
(133,374)
(98,197)
Observations
1,327
1,327
R-squared
0.328
Number of Metro Area
383
383
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the
metropolitan area are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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3.6.2 Effect of School Competition on Gini Coefficients of Home Prices
The estimated coefficient for the effect of school competition on the inequality
of home prices are shown in Table 3.5. The results in this table assume
homogeneity in the unobserved errors. Column 1 represents the estimates from
Pooled OLS regression without any control variables. The estimated coefficient on
HHI of school enrollment in this specification is 0.0330 and is significant at the 1%
level. Column 2 presents coefficients in equation (3.3) using Pooled OLS
regression including the full set of control variables. The estimate of interest is 0.0179 which is significant at the 5% level of significance. Results shown in
columns 3 and 4 recognize county-specific fixed effects. Although I report
estimates from random effects model, my preferred specification is fixed effects
model. Hausman test also suggest that the fixed effects model is appropriate. The
coefficient on the HHI of school enrollment in the fixed effects model is 0.0392 and
is significant at the 1% level. The estimated coefficient from the fixed effects model
supports the hypothesis and suggests that going from fully unrestricted enrollment
(HHI=0) to fully restricted enrollment (HHI=10000) increases the variability by
6.09% at the median.
As in the case of analysis for median home value, I identify the counties with
enough variation across years. This new sample includes 669 counties with the
largest mere 50 percent within-county variation in absolute value in HHI across
years. The results based on this limited sample are shown in Table C.4. Although
the sign of coefficient from Pooled OLS now changes to negative, the sign of the
coefficient from the preferred fixed effects model remains unchanged (positive),
thereby, supporting the hypothesis that an increase in competition is associated
with a decrease in inequality of home prices.
The specifications in Table C.5 relax the assumption of homoskedasticity and
present heteroskedasticity-robust estimates considering clusters at the county
levels. The sign of the coefficient on HHI in the preferred fixed effects model is
positive which is in line with the findings in the previous tables. The coefficient is
significant at the 1% level.
Heteroskedasticity-robust estimates based on the limited sample with clusters
at the county levels are also obtained. These estimates are presented in Table
C.6. Similar to Table C.5, the Pooled OLS estimates contrast the hypothesis
whereas estimates from the preferred fixed effects model are in agreement with
the hypothesis. The coefficient is significant the 1% level of significance.
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Table 3. 5: Estimates for regression of Gini-coefficient of home value using full
sample
(1)
No Control
0.0330***
(0.0112)
3,250
0.009

(2)
OLS
-0.0179**
(0.00805)
3,165
0.705

(3)
FE
HHI
0.0392***
(0.0129)
Observations
3,165
R-squared
0.150
Number of conuties
819
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

(4)
RE
0.0168*
(0.00970)
3,165
819

To address the concern discussed in a previous section, estimates are
obtained by using metropolitan area level observations and including metropolitan
area fixed effects in the estimating equation. Table 3.6 includes such estimates
with metropolitan areas as units of observations. The coefficients from Pooled
OLS, fixed effects as well as random effects specifications are now positive
suggesting that a decrease in concentration is associated with a decrease in
variability in home prices within the metropolitan area. The coefficients from fixed
effects and random effects models are significant at the 10% level of significance
whereas the coefficient from the Pooled OLS is not.

Table 3. 6: Estimates for regression of Gini-coefficient of home value
with metropolitan level data (clustered at metro level)
(1)
OLS
0.000723
(0.0145)
11,427***
(1,637)
1,327
0.669

(2)
(3)
FE
RE
HHI of school enrollment
0.0289*
0.0234*
(0.0171)
(0.0133)
Constant
8,908***
11,660***
(2,366)
(1,552)
Observations
1,327
1,327
R-squared
0.171
Number of metro areas
383
383
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the
metropolitan area are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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As for the final step of the robustness check, the estimates considering countyspecific linear time trend are obtained and shown in Table C.7. Consistent with the
hypothesis and with findings from previously presented specifications, the
coefficient is still positive suggesting that as school competition increases, home
prices become less dispersed. However, the coefficient is now imprecise at any
conventional level of significance.

3.6.3 Understanding the Driving Force in the Composition of HHI
So far, I have examined the response for a change in HHI as a measure of
school competition on home values and the inequality of home value. In general, I
find that an increase in school competition increases home values and decreases
the inequality of home values. However, this analysis does not provide any
information regarding the relative magnitude of driving forces within the
composition of HHI. HHI has been constructed based on four different types of
schools: public, charter, magnet and private. Each of the four types of school is
different in terms of quality of services provided, and therefore, each type of school
may have different driving forces on the overall response. To better understand
how each type of school affects home values and the inequality of home values, I
regress home values and the inequality of home values on the share of total
enrolment for private, charter and magnet school categories along with other
independent variables using fixed effects model. The estimates are presented in
Table 3.7. Column (1) presents the estimates for the regression of median home
values on the share of enrolment in each category. The coefficients on all three
shares are positive and significant. The coefficient on the share of enrolments of
the charter school is more prominent than the coefficients for the other categories.
This is suggestive that charter school is the most prominent in explaining the
variation in home values as compared to other categories. Column (2) presents
the estimates for the regression of the Gini-coefficient of home values on the share
of enrolments in each category. The coefficients on all three shares are negative,
however, the coefficient on the share of enrolment of the magnet school is
significant at the 10% level whereas the other two coefficients are insignificant.
These results are indicative that magnet school has an impact in reducing the
inequality of home prices whereas the other two types of schools are not
prominent.

46

Table 3. 7: Understanding the variation in the composition of enrolment in
HHI
(1)
(2)
Median
Gini coefficient
home value of home values
Share of enrolment of charter school
787.7**
-2.227
(316.7)
(4.987)
Share of enrolment of magnet school
239.2***
-4.870***
(84.06)
(1.659)
Share of enrolment of private school
599.5**
-6.130
(247.6)
(4.988)
Observations
3,165
3,165
R-squared
0.434
0.151
Number of counties
819
819
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by county in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

3.7 Conclusion
My study examines the connection between the expansion of school
competition and property values. Specifically, this study empirically examines the
possible linkages between (1) school competition and the distribution of home
prices, and (2) school competition and median home prices. Utilizing county-level
data from all 50 states across the United States, this study provides evidence that
an increase in school competition is associated with an increase in home value.
Moreover, this study also provides evidence that an expansion of school
competition is associated with a decrease in variability in home value, however,
both findings are sensitive to fixed effects and time trends included in the
specifications. My findings add to the prediction from the existing literature. Reback
(2005) and Brunner et al., (2012) establish a loose connection between the
variability of home prices and school competition using inflow and outflow of
students. Predictions from both studies suggest a reduction in inequality of home
prices for a greater school competition. The finding from my study adds to the
findings from these studies by providing evidence that those predictions hold in the
context of nationally representative data. Moreover, the findings from this study
support the hypothesis that an increase in school competition is associated with
an increase in home prices and vice versa. Furthermore, I find the relative
magnitudes of the driving forces among different types of schools. My findings
provide evidence that the share of enrolment of the charter school is most
prominent in determining the home values whereas the share of enrolment of the
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magnet school is the only statistically significant factor in explaining the inequality
in home values. These results provide some evidence that the market as a whole
values expanded school competition. Whereas the results from my study support
a linkage between school competition and home values, these results should be
interpreted with caution because these results are inconclusive and sensitive to
specifications. Results are significant when I include time-invariant county fixed
effects. However, the estimates are imprecise when I absorb county-specific linear
time trends. These findings are suggestive that school competition may be
correlated with the unobserved linear time trend. Perhaps the growth of wealth of
a county, which can be a determinant of home prices, may increase the demand
for better schooling thereby affecting the school competition, or maybe, other timevarying determinants of home prices can be correlated with the school competition.
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A

Appendix for Chapter 1
Table A. 1: Descriptive statistics
(2)

(3)
1983

Broad income
Taxable income
Federal tax rate
State tax rate
Single
Married
No dependent
One dependent
Two dependents
Three dependents
Under age 65 & not blind
One person over age 65 or
blind
Number of observations

Mean
51,861.23
36,278.10
24.83
4.65
0.24
0.71
0.51
0.18
0.21
0.07
0.89
0.07

Std. Dev.
45,917.04
37,490.10
7.27
3.25
0.43
0.45
0.50
0.38
0.40
0.26
0.31
0.25

4,002

(5)

(6)
1983-88
Mean
Std. Dev.
52,783.29 53,953.10
36,901.19 46,063.13
23.49
7.45
4.49
3.09
0.25
0.43
0.70
0.46
0.52
0.50
0.19
0.39
0.20
0.40
0.06
0.25
0.90
0.30
0.06
0.24
24,731
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(8)

(9)
1988
Mean
Std. Dev.
55,278.36 79,150.78
39,679.14 71,014.75
20.79
6.65
4.34
2.84
0.26
0.44
0.68
0.47
0.54
0.50
0.19
0.39
0.19
0.39
0.06
0.23
0.90
0.29
0.06
0.23
4,247

Table A. 2: First stage estimates for Weber’s baseline
specification in column 1 of Table 1.1
(1)
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡 )
𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
0.17***
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
)
(0.02)
𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
0.12***
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
)
(0.02)
𝑝 4 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
0.15***
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
)
(0.02)
Observations
23,438
R-squared
0.10
First stage F-statistic
121.75
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered
by the individual are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table A. 3: First stage estimates for columns 2-4 of Table 1.1

𝑝 0 𝑙𝑎𝑔

∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡

)

𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠

)

𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠

)

∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡

𝑝 0 𝑙𝑎𝑔

∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1

)

𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠

)

𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠

)

∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1

𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔

)

𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔

)

𝑝 4 𝑙𝑎𝑔

)

∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡

∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Column 2 of Table 1.1
Column 3 of Table 1.1
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡 )
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1 )
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡 ) ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1 )
0.72***
-0.03
(0.02)
(0.02)
0.01
0.03*
0.11***
0.02
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
0.03*
-0.02
0.11***
-0.03
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
0.36***
0.21***
(0.02)
(0.03)
-0.06***
0.14***
-0.02
0.14***
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
-0.03
0.12***
0.01
0.12***
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
0.21***
0.02
(0.02)
(0.02)
0.10***
0.15***
(0.02)
(0.02)

(5)
(6)
Column 4 of Table 1.1
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡 )
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1 )

0.15***
(0.02)
0.12***
(0.02)

0.02
(0.02)
-0.04*
(0.02)

0.02
(0.02)
0.02
(0.02)

0.16***
(0.02)
0.12***
(0.02)

0.10***
0.04**
(0.02)
(0.02)
𝑝 4 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
0.02
0.10***
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Observations
24,731
24,731
24,731
24,731
24,731
24,731
R-squared
0.15
0.05
0.06
0.05
0.06
0.05
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by individual are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
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Table A. 4: First stage estimates for Table 1.2
(1)
(2)
Column 1 of Table 1.2

(3)
(4)
Column 2 of Table 1.2

(5)
(6)
Column 3 of Table 1.2

∆𝑙𝑛(1
∆𝑙𝑛(1
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡 )
∆𝑙𝑛(1
∆𝑙𝑛(1
∆𝑙𝑛(1
− 𝜏𝑡 )
− 𝜏𝑡+1 )
− 𝜏𝑡+1 )
− 𝜏𝑡 )
− 𝜏𝑡+1 )
𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔
0.20***
0.02
0.16***
-0.00
0.18***
-0.01
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
0.12***
0.02
0.08***
-0.00
0.10***
0.00
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
0.11***
-0.02
0.08***
-0.04**
0.10***
-0.04*
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔
0.09***
0.16***
0.05**
0.14***
0.07***
0.14***
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1 )
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.03)
𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
-0.01
0.13***
-0.05**
0.11***
-0.03
0.11***
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.03)
𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
0.01
0.12***
-0.03
0.10***
-0.01
0.11***
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Observations
24,007
24,007
24,007
24,007
24,007
24,007
R-squared
0.06
0.05
0.09
0.06
0.07
0.05
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in parentheses.
p<0.1.
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(7)
(8)
Column 4 of Table
1.2
∆𝑙𝑛(1
∆𝑙𝑛(1
− 𝜏𝑡 )
− 𝜏𝑡+1 )
0.19***
0.01
(0.02)
(0.02)
0.09***
-0.00
(0.02)
(0.02)
0.10***
-0.04*
(0.02)
(0.02)
0.07***
0.15***
(0.02)
(0.03)
-0.03
0.11***
(0.02)
(0.03)
-0.01
0.11***
(0.02)
(0.02)
24,007
24,007
0.07
0.05
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *

Table A. 5: First stage estimates for Table 1.3
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Column 1 of Table 1.3
Column 2 of Table 1.3
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡 ) ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1 ) ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡 ) ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1 )
𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔
0.10***
-0.02
0.19***
0.00
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
)
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.02)
𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
0.02
0.02
0.09***
-0.02
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
)
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
0.05
-0.05
0.07***
-0.06**
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
)
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔
0.09**
0.04
0.04
0.16***
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1 )
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.03)
𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
-0.04
0.10**
-0.05
0.11***
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.03)
𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
-0.01
0.04
-0.04
0.14***
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
Observations
10,984
10,984
13,747
13,747
R-squared
0.06
0.04
0.11
0.07
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A. 6: First stage estimates for Table 1.4
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Single
Single
Married
Married
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡 ) ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1 )
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡 )
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1 )
𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
0.27***
-0.01
0.18***
0.04*
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.02)
𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
0.04
0.01
0.12***
0.02
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
)
(0.06)
(0.05)
(0.02)
(0.02)
𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
0.13**
-0.05
0.09***
-0.02
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
)
(0.06)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.02)
𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔
0.17***
0.10
0.08***
0.16***
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1 )
(0.05)
(0.06)
(0.03)
(0.03)
𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
-0.05
0.16**
0.00
0.12***
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
)
(0.05)
(0.06)
(0.03)
(0.03)
𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
-0.02
0.14**
0.02
0.11***
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
)
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.02)
(0.03)
Observations
6,198
6,198
17,202
17,202
R-squared
0.05
0.03
0.07
0.06
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A. 7: First stage estimates for Table 1.5
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Column 1
Column 1 of
Column 2 of
Column 2 of
Column 3 of
Column 3 of
of Table 1.5
Table 1.5
Table 1.5
Table 1.5
Table 1.5
Table 1.5
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡 ) ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1 )
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡 )
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1 )
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡 )
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1 )
𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
0.21***
0.02
0.17***
-0.01
0.18***
-0.00
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
0.11***
0.02
0.07***
0.00
0.09***
0.01
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
0.11***
-0.03
0.08***
-0.05**
0.09***
-0.04**
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔
0.09***
0.16***
0.05**
0.13***
0.06**
0.13***
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1 )
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
-0.01
0.13***
-0.05*
0.11***
-0.03
0.12***
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
0.00
0.12***
-0.03
0.10***
-0.02
0.11***
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Observations
24,937
24,663
24,937
24,663
24,937
24,663
R-squared
0.06
0.05
0.08
0.06
0.06
0.05
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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B

Appendix for Chapter 2
Table B. 1: Descriptive statistics
(2)

(3)
1983
Mean
Std. Dev.
Broad income
52,925.09
41,374.39
Taxable income
36,008.49
34,458.23
Federal tax rate
24.14
8.33
State tax rate
4.56
3.30
Net of tax base
22.83
15.28
Single
0.15
0.36
Married
0.81
0.39
No dependent
0.44
0.50
One dependent
0.19
0.39
Two dependents
0.24
0.42
Three dependents
0.09
0.28
Under age 65 & not blind
0.89
0.31
One person over age 65 or
0.07
0.26
blind
Number of observations
3,348

(5)

(6)
1983-88
Mean
Std. Dev.
58,895.28
50,764.16
40,279.93
43,225.07
23.86
8.15
4.57
3.17
24.23
14.15
0.15
0.36
0.81
0.40
0.44
0.50
0.20
0.40
0.24
0.43
0.08
0.28
0.91
0.28
0.05
0.23
16,184
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(8)

(9)
1988
Mean
Std. Dev.
68,318.12
75,087.10
48,186.69
66,843.28
21.62
7.02
4.52
2.92
22.40
12.12
0.16
0.37
0.80
0.40
0.44
0.50
0.21
0.41
0.24
0.43
0.07
0.26
0.92
0.27
0.05
0.21
2,214

Table B. 2: First stage regression estimates for Table 2.1

∆ ln 𝛾 𝑝 0 𝑙𝑎𝑔
∆ ln 𝛾 𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔
∆ ln 𝛾 𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔

(1)
∆𝑙𝑛(𝜸)
0.67***
(0.22)
0.18
(0.38)
0.08
(0.34)

∆ ln 𝛾 𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔
∆ ln 𝛾 𝑝 4 𝑙𝑎𝑔

(2)
∆𝑙𝑛(𝜸)

(3)
∆𝑙𝑛(𝜸)

0.54
(0.48)
0.13
(0.36)
0.26
(0.37)

0.74**
(0.35)
-0.53
(0.35)

0.72***
(0.09)
Observations
2,226
2,226
2,226
R-squared
0.89
0.89
0.89
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the
individual are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B. 3: First stage regression estimates for Table 2.2
(1)
∆𝑙𝑛(𝜸)
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟎 𝒍𝒂𝒈 )
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟐 𝒍𝒂𝒈 )
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟑 𝒍𝒂𝒈 )
∆ ln 𝛾 𝑝 0 𝑙𝑎𝑔
∆ ln 𝛾 𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔
∆ ln 𝛾 𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔

0.99***
(0.09)
-0.04
(0.18)
-0.05
(0.18)

(2)
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉)
0.68***
(0.02)
0.10***
(0.02)
0.02
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
0.01
(0.04)
-0.02
(0.04)

(3)
∆𝑙𝑛(𝜸)
0.22***
(0.08)
0.04
(0.08)
-0.26***
(0.08)
0.99***
(0.09)
-0.03
(0.18)
-0.06
(0.17)

∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟏 𝒍𝒂𝒈 )
∆ ln 𝛾 𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟒 𝒍𝒂𝒈 )

(4)
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉)

(5)
∆𝑙𝑛(𝜸)

(6)
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉)

(7)
∆𝑙𝑛(𝜸)

0.20***
(0.02)
0.10***
(0.02)

0.11
(0.08)
-0.21**
(0.08)

0.25***
(0.02)
0.10***
(0.02)

0.09
(0.08)
-0.23***
(0.08)

0.02
(0.05)
-0.03
(0.04)
0.25***
(0.02)
0.01
(0.05)

0.10
(0.25)
0.07
(0.19)
-0.04
(0.08)
0.73***
(0.23)

0.00
(0.04)
-0.09*
(0.05)

0.47**
(0.19)
-0.47
(0.30)

0.17***
0.04
(0.02)
(0.08)
0.09*
0.90***
∆ ln 𝛾 𝑝 4 𝑙𝑎𝑔
(0.05)
(0.27)
Observations
16,184
16,184
16,184
16,184
16,184
16,184
16,184
R-squared
0.85
0.17
0.85
0.10
0.85
0.09
0.85
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table B. 4: First stage regression estimates for Table 2.3

∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟎 𝒍𝒂𝒈 )
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟐 𝒍𝒂𝒈 )
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟑 𝒍𝒂𝒈 )
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 𝑝 0 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟎 𝒍𝒂𝒈 ))
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟐 𝒍𝒂𝒈 ))
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟑 𝒍𝒂𝒈 ))

(1)
(2)
Column 1 of Table 2.3
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉)
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉))
0.66***
-0.10
(0.03)
(0.14)
0.09**
0.16
(0.05)
(0.23)
0.04
-0.16
(0.05)
(0.23)
0.01
1.00***
(0.02)
(0.10)
0.01
-0.02
(0.04)
(0.21)
-0.02
-0.08
(0.04)
(0.20)

∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟏 𝒍𝒂𝒈 )
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟏 𝒍𝒂𝒈 ))
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟒 𝒍𝒂𝒈 )

(3)
(4)
Column 2 of Table 2.3
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉)
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉))

(5)
(6)
Column 3 of Table 2.3
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉)
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉))

0.18***
(0.06)
0.12**
(0.05)

0.18
(0.31)
-0.16
(0.24)

0.24***
(0.05)
0.19***
(0.06)

-0.13
(0.25)
0.42
(0.35)

0.02
(0.05)
-0.03
(0.04)
0.24***
(0.05)
0.01
(0.05)

0.12
(0.29)
0.04
(0.22)
-0.53*
(0.28)
0.74***
(0.27)

0.00
(0.04)
-0.09*
(0.05)

0.47**
(0.22)
-0.56*
(0.34)

0.08
-0.78**
(0.05)
(0.33)
𝑝 4 𝑙𝑎𝑔
𝒑 𝟒 𝒍𝒂𝒈
0.09*
0.99***
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾
∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉
))
(0.05)
(0.31)
Observations
16,184
16,184
16,184
16,184
16,184
16,184
R-squared
0.17
0.80
0.10
0.80
0.09
0.80
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table B. 5: Second stage regression estimates for the sensitivity of income
controls
(1)
No Spline
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉)
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉))

0.111
(0.201)
0.106***
(0.00712)
16,003
-0.203
1 2 3 lags
0.882
61, 3239

(2)
Base-Year
Spline
1.155***
(0.365)
0.104***
(0.00783)
16,003
-0.630
1 2 3 lags
0.698
24, 3354

(3)
1-Year Lagged
Spline
0.253
(0.265)
0.102***
(0.00713)
16,003
-0.241
1 2 3 lags
0.869
32, 3221

(4)
2-Year Lagged
Spline
0.152
(0.250)
0.102***
(0.00710)
16,003
-0.206
1 2 3 lags
0.899
35, 3171

Observations
R-squared
Instruments
Diff-in-Sargan p-val
First stage Fstatistic
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in
parentheses. The first-stage F-statistics in this table adjust for heteroscedasticity clustered
at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B. 6: First stage estimates for Table B.5
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Column 1
Column 2
Column 3
Column 4
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉)
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏
∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉)
∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉)
∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉)
− 𝝉))
− 𝝉))
− 𝝉))
− 𝝉))
0.24***
-0.50*
0.16***
-0.76***
0.19***
-0.59** 0.22***
-0.53*
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟏 𝒍𝒂𝒈 )
(0.05)
(0.28)
(0.05)
(0.28)
(0.05)
(0.28)
(0.05)
(0.28)
𝒑 𝟐 𝒍𝒂𝒈
0.18***
0.17
0.11**
-0.04
0.14**
0.10
0.13**
0.10
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉
)
(0.06)
(0.31)
(0.06)
(0.30)
(0.06)
(0.30)
(0.06)
(0.31)
0.11**
-0.19
0.07
-0.27
0.09*
-0.20
0.09*
-0.20
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟑 𝒍𝒂𝒈 )
(0.05)
(0.24)
(0.05)
(0.25)
(0.05)
(0.24)
(0.05)
(0.24)
0.02
0.75***
0.03
0.80***
0.02
0.77***
0.01
0.75***
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟏 𝒍𝒂𝒈 ))
(0.05)
(0.27)
(0.04)
(0.26)
(0.04)
(0.27)
(0.05)
(0.27)
𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔
𝒑 𝟐 𝒍𝒂𝒈
0.00
0.08
0.01
0.11
0.01
0.10
0.01
0.11
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾
∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉
))
(0.05)
(0.29)
(0.05)
(0.28)
(0.05)
(0.28)
(0.05)
(0.29)
𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔
𝒑 𝟑 𝒍𝒂𝒈
-0.02
0.06
-0.03
-0.01
-0.03
0.03
-0.03
0.05
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾
∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉
))
(0.04)
(0.22)
(0.04)
(0.22)
(0.04)
(0.22)
(0.04)
(0.22)
Observations
16,003
16,003
16,003
16,003
16,003
16,003 16,003
16,003
R-squared
0.10
0.80
0.15
0.80
0.11
0.80
0.11
0.80
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table B. 7: Second stage regression estimates for IV regressions with different
difference lengths

∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉)1−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉))1−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓

(1)
1-year diff
0.374*
(0.223)
0.0682***
(0.00605)

∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉)2−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓

(2)
2-year diff

(3)
3-year diff

0.0972
(0.201)
0.106***
(0.00705)

∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉))2−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉)3−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓

-0.997*
(0.570)
0.123***
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉))3−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
(0.00811)
Observations
21,024
16,184
12,221
R-squared
-0.272
-0.198
-0.072
Instruments
1 2 3 lags
1 2 3 lags
1 2 3 lags
Diff-in-Sargan p-val
0.237
0.862
0.817
First stage F-statistic
40, 4392
62, 3278
23, 2275
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in
parentheses. The first-stage F-statistics in this table adjust for heteroscedasticity
clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B. 8: First stage estimates for Table B.7

∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟏 𝒍𝒂𝒈 )1−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟐 𝒍𝒂𝒈 )1−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟑 𝒍𝒂𝒈 )1−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉𝒑 𝟏 𝒍𝒂𝒈 ))1−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉𝒑 𝟐 𝒍𝒂𝒈 ))1−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔

∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾
∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉𝒑 𝟑 𝒍𝒂𝒈 ))1−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓

(1)
(2)
Column 1 of Table B.7
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉))
0.20***
-0.54**
(0.05)
(0.23)
0.14***
-0.04
(0.05)
(0.25)
0.12***
-0.10
(0.04)
(0.25)
-0.03
0.53**
(0.04)
0.01

(0.21)
0.22

(0.04)
0.03

(0.23)
0.18

(0.04)

(0.24)

∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟏 𝒍𝒂𝒈 )2−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓

(3)
(4)
Column 2 of Table B.7
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉))

0.24***
(0.05)
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-0.29
(0.33)

(5)
(6)
Column 3 of Table B.7
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉))

Table B.8: First stage estimates for Table B.7 (continued)
(1)
(2)
Column 1 of Table B.7
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉))
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟐 𝒍𝒂𝒈 )2−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟑 𝒍𝒂𝒈 )2−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉𝒑 𝟏 𝒍𝒂𝒈 ))2−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓

(3)
(4)
Column 2 of Table B.7
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉))
0.18***
-0.42
(0.06)
(0.41)
0.12**
0.33
(0.05)
(0.31)
0.01
0.22

𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔

(0.05)
0.02

(0.30)
0.62

𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔

(0.05)
-0.03

(0.38)
-0.41

(0.04)

(0.28)

∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾
∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉𝒑 𝟐 𝒍𝒂𝒈 ))2−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾
∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉𝒑 𝟑 𝒍𝒂𝒈 ))2−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟏 𝒍𝒂𝒈 )3−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓

(5)
(6)
Column 3 of Table B.7
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉))

0.12***
(0.04)
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-0.01
(0.39)

Table B.8: First stage estimates for Table B.7 (continued)
(1)
(2)
Column 1 of Table B.7
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉))
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟐 𝒍𝒂𝒈 )3−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟑 𝒍𝒂𝒈 )3−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉𝒑 𝟏 𝒍𝒂𝒈 ))3−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓

(3)
(4)
Column 2 of Table B.7
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉))

(5)
(6)
Column 3 of Table B.7
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉))
0.06
-0.46
(0.05)
(0.54)
0.03
0.34
(0.04)
(0.32)
-0.01
0.12

𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔

(0.04)
-0.01

(0.39)
0.50

𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔

(0.05)
0.02

(0.51)
-0.28

∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾
∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉𝒑 𝟐 𝒍𝒂𝒈 ))3−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾
∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉𝒑 𝟑 𝒍𝒂𝒈 ))3−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓

(0.03)
(0.28)
Observations
21,024
21,024
16,184
16,057
12,233
11,769
R-squared
0.05
0.82
0.10
0.27
0.06
0.22
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by individual are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.

71

C

Appendix for Chapter 3

Table C. 1: Summary statistics
Mean
Std. Dev.
Median home value
198,156
108,921
Gini Coefficient of Home Value
6,438
919.7
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of school enrollment
7,942
1,430
Total housing units
135,037
219,430
Percent of occupied units
88.09
6.551
Percent of structure with 1 unit detached
65.94
11.09
Percent of structures with 1 unit attached
5.109
5.210
Percent of structures with 2 units
3.565
3.121
Percent of structures with 3 or 4 units
3.982
2.409
Percent of structures with 5 to 9 units
4.342
2.178
Percent of structures with 10 to 19 units
3.782
2.575
Percent of structures with 20 or more units
5.676
5.907
Percent of units with 1 room
1.683
1.705
Percent of units with 2 rooms
2.065
1.482
Percent of units with 3 rooms
7.511
3.403
Percent of units with 4 rooms
15.65
3.958
Percent of units with 5 rooms
20.72
4.612
Percent of units with 6 rooms
18.76
3.388
Percent of units with 7 rooms
12.92
2.576
Percent of units with 8 rooms
9.072
2.773
Percent of units occupied by owner
67.00
8.998
Percent of units with no vehicles
7.075
5.176
Percent of units with one vehicle
32.72
5.488
Percent of units with two vehicles
38.80
4.779
Percent of units with no telephone
2.569
1.380
Percent of units with mortgage
64.52
8.797
Monthly cost for units with mortgage
1,472
439.6
Percent of structures built after 1980
47.68
16.99
Total population
327,870
575,999
Percent of male population
49.23
1.204
Median Age
38.20
4.599
Percent of white population
81.59
14.57
Percent of Hispanic or Latino
11.16
13.05
Median household income
80,995
18,278
Observations
3,250
3,250
Note: The data set includes county-level panel data for four years for 819 counties.
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Table C. 2: Robust estimates for regression of home value using limited sample
with cluster at county level
(1)
OLS
-4.838***
(1.102)
1,591
0.898

(2)
(3)
FE
RE
HHI
-2.287***
-4.555***
(0.804)
(0.858)
Observations
1,591
1,591
R-squared
0.437
Number of counties
669
669
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the county are in
parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C. 3: Estimates for regression of home value with
county-specific time trends
(1)
-0.107
(0.677)
Constant
-274,233***
(80,115)
Observations
3,156
R-squared
0.996
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
HHI of school enrollment
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Table C. 4: Estimates for regression of Gini coefficient of home value using
limited sample

HHI

(1)
NO
CONTRL
0.0158
(0.0169)
1,627
0.013

(2)
OLS

(3)
FE

(4)
RE

-0.0198*
(0.0114)
1,591
0.725

0.0391**
0.0211*
(0.0160)
(0.0117)
Observations
1,591
1,591
R-squared
0.218
Number of counties
669
669
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C. 5: Heteroskedasticity-robust estimates for regression
of Gini coefficient of home values clustered at county level
using full sample
(1)
OLS
-0.0179
(0.0130)
3,165
0.705

(4)
(5)
FE
RE
HHI
0.0392***
0.0168
(0.0135)
(0.0106)
Observations
3,165
3,165
R-squared
0.150
Number of counties
819
819
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the
county are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table C. 6: Robust estimates for regression of Gini coefficient of home
values clustered at county level using limited sample
(1)
OLS
-0.0198
(0.0145)
1,591
0.725

(4)
(5)
FE
RE
HHI
0.0391***
0.0211*
(0.0137)
(0.0110)
Observations
1,591
1,591
R-squared
0.218
Number of counties
669
669
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the county are in
parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C. 7: Estimates for regression of Gini-coefficient with county-specific time
trend
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of school enrollment
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(1)
0.00401
(0.0145)
13,819***
(1,719)
3,156
0.971

VITA

Md Sabbirul Haque was born in Netrokona, Bangladesh on January 16, 1979. He
received a Bachelor of Science in Applied Physics, Electronics and
Communication Engineering from the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh in 2004
and a Master of Arts in Economics from the University of Tennessee, Knoxville in
2017. He earned his Doctor of Philosophy in Economics in August 2020.

76

